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INTRODUCTION
The ideal of America as a racial and ethnic melting pot is a
fundamental archetype in our national mythology. But discomfort
with the idea of miscegenation and with the individuals born to
parents of different races is equally fundamental to the American
story. Indeed, one historian documents the punishment of Captain
1
Daniel Elfrye for “too freely entertaining a mulatto” in 1632. Since
then, racial mixing has engendered a continuously evolving social
unease, troubling different groups for different reasons at different
times. But the underlying inquietude has persisted. At times, this
discomfort has manifested itself through legal mechanisms—for
example, as a statutory scheme designed to police the boundaries of
racial classification based on blood quantum. At other times, the
discomfort has emerged through direct social interaction—for
example, as violence directed at interracial couples and at individuals
viewed as racially mixed.
Despite the historical and ongoing hostility to racial mixing, our
legal system consistently fails to recognize racism directed at those
seen as racially mixed. Race discrimination jurisprudence relies
heavily on a familiar set of racial categories that David Hollinger has
termed the “ethno-racial pentagon” of Asian, Latino/a, White, Black,
2
and Native American. Science has largely demonstrated that the
1. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (1997) (quoting
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO,
1550–1812, at 166 (1968)).
2. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 23–25
(1995). People tend to assert that “Latino/a” or “Hispanic” is an ethnicity rather
than a race, or that it should be discussed as a different type of category than races
such as “Black,” “Asian,” and so forth. See, e.g., Katherine Culliton-González, Time to
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boundaries of these crude categories are arbitrary and that the
categories themselves are social constructs rather than biological
3
Nonetheless, the categories constitute the paradigm
realities.
through which we view race. And antidiscrimination jurisprudence
continues to reflect and reify those categories in recognizing and
remedying claims of racial discrimination.
This Article aims to expose the shortcomings of the prevailing
crude racial categories as a means to implement the core provisions
of antidiscrimination law—constitutional and statutory provisions
such as the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, and the
jurisprudence that has developed around these provisions. Such
provisions are designed to address racial discrimination by
prohibiting inequitable treatment of individuals based on race and by
punishing such inequitable treatment when it occurs. The provisions
are not intended to protect specific racial categories. Rather,
categories are simply the mechanism that the judiciary has adopted
for implementing the goals of our antidiscrimination regime.
In light of these goals, I demonstrate that a categorical approach to
race renders antidiscrimination jurisprudence inhospitable to claims
brought by individuals who allege that they were discriminated
Revive Puerto Rican Voting Rights, 19 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 27, 46–47 n.150 (2008)
(explaining that “Hispanic” or “Latino” is generally a term describing ethnicity in the
United States and that Latinos can be of different races). The U.S. Census treats
“Hispanic” as an ethnicity, asking respondents first to identify themselves as
“Spanish/Hispanic/Latino” or non-Hispanic, and then asking separately what race
they are. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census
2000, Form D-61A, available at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d61a.pdf.
I acknowledge that some have argued in favor of treating Latino/a as other than a
race. See, e.g., Juan Perea, Five Axioms in Search of Equality, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 231,
241 (1997) (arguing that ethnicity is a more appropriate categorization for Latinos
for purposes of understanding discrimination because it encompasses aspects of race
as well as characteristics such as language and history). Nonetheless, I believe that
for purposes of this Article, it is more appropriate to adopt a functional definition of
Latino/a. In the eyes of society, the label “Latino/a” functions similarly to the other
four points on the ethno-racial pentagon; therefore, I refer to Latino/a as a race.
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the MexicanAmerican Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1997) (explaining that Latinos have
been categorized as a race because of their perceived status as “foreigners” and their
limitations in assimilation).
3. See generally JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL
THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2001) (employing research in the field of
human genetics to demonstrate the lack of scientific justification for regarding
human populations as belonging to distinct racial groups); Ian F. Haney López,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11–16 (1994) (noting that scientific data demonstrates
that “greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled Black
and White than between these populations”).
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against because they were perceived as multiracial.
Categories
suppress ambiguity and stifle nuance, channeling plaintiffs who have
suffered discrimination based on their perceived mixed ancestry into
recognized monoracial narratives of discrimination. Courts’ reliance
on categories thus obscures racial animus specifically directed at
those perceived as multiracial.
Consequently, by relying on
categories, courts blunt antidiscrimination law as a tool to promote
racial understanding and eliminate racism.
No scholarly work has previously focused on the treatment of
individuals specifically identified as multiracial in antidiscrimination
5
jurisprudence. The absence is surprising in light of the sheer
6
volume of scholarship relating to multiracial individuals.
In discussing racial identities that transcend Hollinger’s ethno-racial
pentagon, scholars have generally focused on the problems related to
7
recognizing and categorizing multiracial people. Much research has
4. I use terms such as “mixed-race,” “multiracial,” and “biracial” throughout this
Article, and I believe that it is critical to explain what I do and do not mean by these
terms for purposes of my discussion. To some extent, the terms “multiracial” and
“biracial” seem to rely on the idea of biological races: for someone to be multiracial,
they must be a mixture of two “pure” races. Some scholars have thus criticized the
use of the term “multiracial” as embracing an outdated biological view of race.
See, e.g., RAINIER SPENCER, CHALLENGING MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY 2 (2006) (associating
the advocacy of multiracial identity with the belief “that biological race exists as a
physical reality”). I explicitly renounce the notion that there is a biological basis for
race. Rather, I view race as a socially constructed phenomenon. But my view does
not render race a phenomenon undeserving of legal recognition. Some people are
perceived by society either as racially mixed or as simultaneous members of two
socially recognized monoracial groups. The fact that this socially perceived identity
exists and exerts social force is the notion that I invoke in this Article when I use the
word “multiracial.”
5. One scholar has mentioned discrimination against multiracial individuals in
the larger context of arguing that focusing on the employer’s discriminatory intent is
a better test for Title VII claims than an immutable-trait analysis. See Ken Nakasu
Davison, Note, The Mixed Race Experience: Treatment of Racially Miscategorized
Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161 (2005).
6. Indeed, several anthologies of such scholarship are currently in print.
See, e.g., AMERICAN MIXED RACE: THE CULTURE OF MICRODIVERSITY (Naomi Zack ed.,
1995) (exploring identity theory as well as the personal, artistic, social science, and
public policy implications of mixed race); THE MULTIRACIAL EXPERIENCE: RACIAL
BORDERS AS THE NEW FRONTIER (Maria P. P. Root ed., 1996) (examining aspects of
gender, education, and rights through the use of personal narratives); THE NEW RACE
QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS (Joel Perlmann &
Mary C. Waters eds., 2002) (analyzing the national policy implications of the census
allowing respondents to choose their race); RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA
(Maria P. P. Root ed., 1992) (looking at issues involving categorization, multiracial
children, and the census).
7. See, e.g., SPENCER, supra note 4 (criticizing multiracial scholarship for
bolstering traditional racial categories); RONALD R. SUNDSTROM, THE BROWNING OF
AMERICA AND THE EVASION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (2008) (reflecting on shifting
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examined the sense of disenfranchisement experienced by people
who identify themselves as multiracial or as belonging to multiple
8
Scholars have explored the individual
racial categories.
9
psychological harms that result from such racial alienation and have
discussed whether demographic mechanisms, such as the census,
should provide a forum for self-identified multiracial people to assert
10
their self-perceived identities.
While these issues are surely worthy of scholarly exploration,
I believe that acknowledging animus directed at people whom others
demographics and their impact on race theory and political philosophy); KIM M.
WILLIAMS, MARK ONE OR MORE: CIVIL RIGHTS IN MULTIRACIAL AMERICA (2006) (noting
various levels of recognition of multiracial interests according to factors such as total
minority population and liberal/progressive tendencies of a state); Nancy A. Denton,
Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect Categories Yield Correct Information?,
15 LAW & INEQ. 83 (1997) (articulating the importance of the difference between
social and individual identity); Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the
Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ. 183 (1993) (recognizing the constant social and
psychological questioning that multiracial individuals face); Tanya Katerí
Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998) (questioning the implementation of
multiracial discourse in the quest for racial equality as hiding the racial impact of
supposedly race-neutral laws); Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race
and the National Imagination, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1701 (2003) (highlighting the efforts
of mixed race individuals to gain recognition by the census and noting the
interdependence of legal and cultural categories); John A. Powell, The Colorblind
Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789 (1997)
(analyzing the limitations of colorblind and multiracial-position advocacy and
acknowledging, instead, the different levels at which race operates); Kim FordeMazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial
Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994) (challenging the practice of racial-matching by
courts and child-placement agencies, and arguing for a choice in the child’s best
interest).
8. See, e.g., JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR,
COMMUNITY (1995) (providing insight through accounts of a mixed race woman
often mistaken for a white woman); GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR
LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995)
(telling the story of a White boy who discovers that he has poor Black relatives who
are passing as White); Johnson, supra note 2 (describing how multiracial individuals
are marginalized or ignored and thus shut out of discourse); Adrian Piper, Passing for
White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSITION 4 (1992) (recounting how the author was
isolated from both races because she was a light-skinned middle-class Black woman).
9. See, e.g., Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 189–90 (“Multiracial individuals
constantly confront sociological and psychological identity questions . . . . In
general, multiracial people have problems coping with their marginal status.”).
10. See, e.g., THE NEW RACE QUESTION, supra note 6, at 40 (“When selfidentification is used to identify race . . . respondents should be given the
opportunity to identify with more than one race, but the term ‘multiracial’ is not to
be used. Rather, the names of specific races are to be presented as choices for the
respondent.”); Denton, supra note 7, at 92–96 (suggesting a two-question scheme
regarding personal and social identification); Powell, supra note 7, at 794–95
(identifying a discrepancy between how the government classifies groups compared
to common usage).
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identify as multiracial is an urgent task fundamental to the project of
situating multiracial people within a jurisprudence targeted at
combating racism. Race matters in the first instance only because
some people are treated differently—and worse—because of their
race. Therefore, understanding how and why people who are viewed
as racially mixed suffer racial discrimination should be the first step
in theorizing how the legal system should regard such people.
Throughout this Article, I pass no judgment on who “is” or “is not”
racially mixed. This approach is appropriate given my focus on
discrimination, where the key question is not whether someone is in
fact of a particular race, but rather whether a discriminator perceives
that person to be a member of that race. Therefore, I employ an
outsider’s perspective in discussing racial identification. When I refer
to “Asian people,” for example, by default I mean people who are
identified as Asian by other people (or by a specific other person).
And when I refer to “multiracial people” or “mixed-race people,”
I mean those who are identified as multiracial. Determining whether
mixed-race identification is “accurate” in any particular instance—or,
indeed, defining what “accuracy” entails—is not my project here.
Likewise, when I refer to an “interracial relationship,” I mean a
relationship between two people whom society views as members of
different racial groups. Again, whether the individuals are “really”
members of different races does not concern me.
I clearly indicate the few instances where I depart from this “otheridentified” approach to racial identity. The departure is necessary
because mixed-race self-identification has gained traction as a social
phenomenon, and as a result, many Americans voluntarily identify
themselves as “mixed-race,” “biracial,” or “multiracial.” This selfidentification is relevant to my project because a person who views
herself as multiracial may choose to engage in a wide array of identity
performance that leads other people also to identify her as
multiracial. Moreover, a plaintiff who identifies herself as multiracial
and who claims discrimination on that basis may experience
alienation if her narrative of discriminatory treatment is distorted by
a court intent on conforming that narrative to a category-reliant
jurisprudence. But identifying oneself as multiracial is neither
11
necessary nor sufficient to being identified as multiracial by others.

11. See Mezey, supra note 7, at 1753 (“People discriminate based on who they
think you are and not how you understand yourself.”).
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So just as I need not pass judgment on whether outside identification
of an individual as multiracial is accurate, I also need not pass
judgment on whether an individual’s self-identification as multiracial
is accurate.
Finally, I acknowledge color discrimination as an issue related to
but distinct from multiracial discrimination.
Because physical
appearance is one characteristic by which society identifies people as
mixed-race, undoubtedly skin color cues multiracial identification in
some instances. But as I explain, physical appearance is not the only
characteristic by which an individual might come to be identified as
racially mixed, nor will any particular physical trait automatically cue
multiracial identification. Thus, race and color are not coextensive
in the context of multiracial discrimination. An individual might
suffer color discrimination even if others do not identify him as
multiracial. Likewise, he might suffer discrimination on the basis of
12
multiracial identification regardless of the color of his skin.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly discusses the
myriad ways by which people might come to identify an individual as
racially mixed. Such identification might result from a number of
cues, including physical appearance, language, speech, name,
association with family members or friends, behavior, or any other
factor that might be interpreted as a racial cue. I need not address
whether such identification is “accurate” to conclude that the
identification may engender tangible consequences for how the
mixed-identified individual is treated.
Part II then explores the phenomenon of animus against
individuals perceived as racially mixed. I begin by summarizing the
historical roots of animus against mixed-race people. Well into the
twentieth century, both scientists and society at large generally agreed
that mixed-race people were genetically inferior to “pure” members
of all races. This consensus both flowed from and supported a
generalized hostility toward racial mixing and multiracial people, and
was instrumental in justifying statutory prohibitions on miscegenation
in many states.
13
The Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia removed legal
14
obstacles to interracial marriage, and the subsequent increase in

12. Future research might usefully interrogate the overlap and distinction
between multiracial discrimination and color discrimination.
13. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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interracial unions laid the groundwork for the multiracial identity
movement. That movement increased social awareness of individuals
who identify themselves as multiracial or who are identified as such
by others, and these individuals have been accorded a measure of
legal recognition in certain contexts outside of the core provisions of
15
But recent research indicates that many
antidiscrimination law.
people still view interracial marriage—and, by extension, children
born of such marriages—as undesirable. I conclude that animus
against multiracial people persists today and results in tangible
negative treatment of people viewed as multiracial.
Part III examines the paucity of discrimination claims filed by
individuals who are socially identified as racially mixed. This absence
is surprising given the persistence of animus against those viewed as
multiracial. As noted, antidiscrimination law is intended to ensure
that individuals are not treated differently from one another on the
basis of race, and the current jurisprudence interpreting those laws
relies heavily on the existence of clear racial categories. Within this
realm, plaintiffs who allege discrimination based on an ascribed noncategorical identity remain largely unacknowledged. To the extent
that the courts do acknowledge or accord protection to such
plaintiffs, they generally skirt the non-categorical nature of the
identity in question or they attempt to adapt the identity to conform
to the prevailing categorical scheme.

14. Id. at 12 (holding that a prohibition of interracial marriage violated the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution).
15. In some legal contexts, individuals who identify themselves as multiracial
have succeeded in gaining acknowledgement that either they or society—or perhaps
both—view traditional racial categories as inadequate to capture their racial identity.
In what I refer to as the “diversity” context, a program is structured around the
benefits that are believed to flow from the integration of people whom society
perceives as members of multiple racial categories. This justification applies to
policies such as affirmative action and school redistricting. Some such programs
allow individuals to identify as multiracial and to have their contribution to diversity
assessed on that basis. And in what I refer to as the “demographic” context, a
program involves governmental efforts to gather and retain statistical information
about individual members of our population from which a variety of policy decisions
and legal outcomes flow. The census is the obvious example of the demographic
context, but various state data-gathering contexts and other governmental
data-collection efforts also fall within this category. In some instances within this
context, individuals are likewise given the opportunity to assert multiracial
identification, either explicitly or by checking multiple boxes corresponding to racial
classifications. Neither the diversity context nor the demographic context is the
focus of this Article, but in both contexts, individuals who identify themselves as
racially mixed have gained a measure of recognition.
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Part IV considers the troubling consequences of the phenomenon
described in Part III. On an individual level, when a judicial actor
revises a plaintiff’s narrative of multiracial discrimination, that
plaintiff suffers injury to his dignity and alienation from the legal
system. Such revision also renders antidiscrimination jurisprudence
inhospitable to claims by mixed-race individuals, making it difficult
for an individual to succeed on a claim explicitly alleging multiracial
discrimination. And on a broader social level, the suppression of
non-categorical claims of discrimination leaves unaddressed the
unique type of animus directed at multiracial individuals.
For example, the discrimination suffered by an individual who has
one Black and one White parent is not necessarily a subset of the
discrimination directed at Black individuals or White individuals.
Rather, the Black/White individual may suffer discrimination
precisely because he is perceived as racially mixed rather than as a
“full” member of one category or the other. Courts’ failure to
recognize the possibility of discrimination specific to mixed-race
individuals is self-perpetuating: a lack of precedent acknowledging
multiracial discrimination decreases the likelihood that future
decisions will acknowledge such discrimination. Moreover, this
failure stifles awareness of multiracial discrimination and impedes an
open discussion that might catalyze eradication of such forms of
discrimination. And finally, courts’ use of prevailing monoracial
categories to remedy multiracial discrimination reifies the rigid
monoracial categories as “true” and further entrenches them in social
consciousness.
In Part V, therefore, I offer a general outline for incorporating
claims of discrimination by people identified as multiracial into
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. The framework I propose can
readily be implemented under existing constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions; it neither contradicts existing jurisprudence
nor does away with categories altogether. Rather, the framework
would supplement current jurisprudence with a means to identify
and remedy discrimination based on animus that does not fit easily
into a category. I do not advocate for the recognition of a sixth
category—“multiracial”—that would receive equal standing with the
other five. Instead, I hope to show that courts may address racial
discrimination without necessarily consigning the plaintiff to any of
the conventional racial categories. My proposed framework would
allow movement past our current racisms and toward a more
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nuanced understanding of the social construction of race—one in
which racial identity is both fluid and contingent, and, to the extent
that racial categories exist, they no longer bear the stigma associated
with years past.
I.

16

“WHAT ARE YOU?” : CUEING PERCEPTION OF RACIAL MIXING

The view of race as a social rather than a biological phenomenon is
not a recent development. More than twenty years ago, the Supreme
Court acknowledged research positing that racial categories are
invented social constructions:
Many modern biologists and anthropologists . . . criticize racial
classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the
variability of human beings.
It is said that genetically
homogeneous populations do not exist and traits are not
discontinuous between populations; therefore, a population can
only be described in terms of relative frequencies of various traits.
Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which have
generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as
having little biological significance. It has been found that
differences between individuals of the same race are often greater
than the differences between the “average” individuals of different
races. These observations and others have led some, but not all,
scientists to conclude that racial classifications are for the most part
17
sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature.

Subsequent advances in scientific understanding have confirmed
that race is, in fact, a social construction rather than a biological
18
reality. Because race is socially constructed, racial mixing is as well.
Without the social perception that people belong to different racial
categories, society would attach no particular label to the offspring of
19
a relationship between supposed members of different races.
But having parents who are members of different socially ascribed
racial categories is neither necessary nor sufficient to one’s
identification as a multiracial person. Rather, many factors may lead
to perception of an individual as racially mixed. I emphasize that

16. PEARL FUYO GASKINS, WHAT ARE YOU?: VOICES OF MIXED-RACE YOUNG PEOPLE 5
(1999) (“As a racially mixed person, I have been asked . . . ‘What are you?’ or ‘Where
are you from?’ countless times by curious and sometimes obnoxious people . . . .”).
17. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987).
18. See sources cited supra note 3.
19. Likewise, individuals would be unlikely to attach a “multiracial” label to
themselves if their parents were not perceived as members of different races.
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such perception need not be “accurate”—whatever accuracy might
entail—to result in tangible negative consequences for how the
person viewed as multiracial is treated. Rather, the point is that
various cues may lead one person to perceive another as multiracial,
and that this labeling may alter the way the perceiver treats the
multiracial-labeled person.
An individual may come to be labeled as multiracial in two primary
ways. The first consists of identification triggered solely or primarily
by various physical traits or by an aggregation of those markers.
Camille Rich offers a thorough analysis of the cognitive process of
“morphology-based racial/ethnic ascription,” explaining that such
ascription occurs when someone “interprets another person’s visible,
physical features to correlate with a set of features she identifies with
20
a certain race or ethnic group.” Features triggering racial ascription
21
include skin color, hair texture, and nose or eye shape. Although
most people believe that they can identify others’ race or ethnicity
based on morphology, in some instances, individuals are forced to
acknowledge that morphology “fail[s] to provide a clear basis for
22
identifying another person’s race or ethnicity.” In the aggregate,
morphological markers may lead to an individual being seen as
racially ambiguous—the kind of person of whom strangers often
inquire, “What are you?” or perhaps, “What’s your ancestry?” Many
individuals, therefore, are identified as racially mixed based purely on
23
their physical appearance.
Because genetic variance is unpredictable, not all people whose
parents would be perceived as members of different socially
constructed racial categories would themselves be perceived as
20. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1145 (2004) (identifying ascription
of race and ethnicity as learned responses).
21. Id. at 1146.
22. Id. at 1146–48 (correlating increased human interaction with increased
evidence of the limitations of morphology).
23. The likelihood of an individual being labeled multiracial may be higher for
some racial combinations than for others. Given America’s ugly history of slave rape
and hypodescent, I suspect that, in many instances, society instinctively labels
Black/White individuals as Black even if they are relatively light-skinned and their
other physical features tend to connote some degree of White ancestry. With respect
to Asian/White individuals, I believe that there is more social iconography
encouraging identification of such people as mixed. See, e.g., KIP FULBECK, PART
ASIAN, 100% HAPA (2006) (featuring portraits and self-descriptions of individuals who
identify themselves as racially mixed and Asian). I do not pursue this tentative
conclusion further here, but perhaps it will provide interesting fodder for future
research.
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mixed-race upon sight. Rather, such people are sometimes labeled as
24
The second form of
monoracial based on purely physical cues.
multiracial labeling, therefore, occurs when a person who is initially
perceived as monoracial based on morphology comes to be perceived
as multiracial—that is, when some other factor leads the perceiver to
view the person as racially mixed. The perceiver’s reaction in that
instance is not “What are you?” but rather “You’re not what I thought
you were.”
With respect to the second form of multiracial labeling, many
factors other than physical appearance may trigger perception of an
individual as mixed-race. An individual’s style of speech—accent,
vocabulary, syntax, and so on—may run counter to impressions
created by that individual’s physical appearance, perhaps leading to
the conclusion that the person is racially mixed. One study found
that people are only seventy percent accurate at identifying others’
25
race based solely on hearing their voices. While the study did not
specify how the race of the participants was identified or how mixedrace people were classified, its findings reinforce the notion that
speech may influence perception of race. For example, if the
perceiver initially forms an impression of someone’s race based on a
telephone conversation, that impression might be revised based on a
subsequent in-person encounter.
Language may likewise cue perception of an individual as
multiracial.
Perhaps an employee could pass as White but
occasionally speaks Spanish in the workplace, either to other
employees or to friends or relatives on the telephone within earshot
of colleagues. That employee, while initially perceived by coworkers
as White, might come to be perceived as multiracial. At the very least,
the use of Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Swahili, or any other language
might trigger questions that would lead to the bilingual individual
24. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 1287 (suggesting that Latinos and AfricanAmericans with lighter complexions might have more choice regarding their
asserted identity as opposed to being assigned a socially constructed race by others
based on sight); Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 3–4 (2004)
(contending that stereotypes about assimilating Asians influence the physical erasure
of multiracial individuals, including Keanu Reaves and Dean Cain, mixed-race actors
who are regarded as white in the popular media).
25. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1308–09 (2005). This study was one of a series of phonetic
experiments examining the correlation of perception of speech and discrimination.
See Thomas Purnell et al., Perceptual and Phonetic Experiments on American English Dialect
Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 19–22 (1999).
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“outing” herself as racially mixed by explaining that she learned the
language in question from her parents or grandparents.
An individual’s first, middle, or last name may also cue mixed-race
identification. Angela Onwuachi-Willig relates the story of a White
friend named Nyasha who frequently encounters surprise when
people meet her in person, having assumed, based on her name, that
26
she was Black. Similarly, many mixed Asian children are given an
Anglo first name and an Asian middle name by their parents.
An employer who previously viewed a particular employee as White
might consequently come to perceive him as multiracial after seeing
his Asian middle name listed on company paperwork. I note that the
inferences drawn from a name need not be accurate to cement an
impression of a person as racially mixed. For example, were Nyasha’s
morphology sufficiently ambiguous, others might come to perceive
her as partially Black based on her name and their interpretation of
her morphology in light of her name.
Association may also cue identification as mixed race. For
27
example, in Mitchell v. Champs Sports, the plaintiff testified that her
mother was White and that her father was Black, but based on her
appearance, “many people consider her of mixed Hispanic and
28
European descent.” However, the plaintiff was often visited at the
store where she worked by Black friends and relatives, and her
treatment by her supervisor rapidly deteriorated after he observed
29
these visits and identified her as a person with Black ancestry.
Likewise, an employee’s marriage to or partnership with a person
perceived to belong to a particular race may lead to a perception that
the employee is racially mixed—i.e., that he is a “partial” member of
his partner’s ascribed race. This is particularly likely if he makes his
relationship visible by introducing his partner to his coworkers or by
displaying pictures of his partner on his desk. Indeed, even a
superficially insignificant associative act, such as an employee’s
decision to eat lunch with a group of employees whose ascribed race
is inconsistent with his own physical appearance, may trigger
multiracial identification.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 25, at 1301 n.72.
42 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
Id. at 646.
Id.
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Additionally, any number of behaviors may lead others to view an
30
individual as mixed-race. For example, a man who appears White in
the eyes of society might list membership in an Asian Pacific
American student organization on his resume, thereby inducing an
31
employer to perceive him as part-Asian. A relatively fair-skinned
woman with kinky hair might restyle her hair in cornrows, causing
her boss to view her as part-Black. An olive-skinned, Spanishspeaking man with the surname “Ramirez” may announce his intent
to visit his mother’s side of the family in Japan, triggering
assumptions—or at least questions—about whether his mother is
Asian. The extent to which an individual intentionally engages in
behavior designed to promote a certain perception of his racial
background is a rich and fascinating topic. Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati have examined the incentives to perform racial identity in a
certain way—to “work identity”—and the consequences of that
32
performance.
While I believe that this topic is important and
deserving of close examination, for present purposes, it will suffice to
posit intentional identity performance, or identity work, as another
mechanism by which an individual might come to be perceived as
racially mixed.
I cannot overemphasize the role of the perceiver in multiracial
identification. With respect to any non-physical factor—speech,
language, name, association, and other behavior—the perceiver’s
recognition of the potential cue may also cause the perceiver to
become more attentive to certain physical traits that, correctly or
incorrectly, cue a designation of racial mixedness in the perceiver’s
mind. Relatedly, the way in which an individual is labeled based
purely on physical appearance may depend on external factors, such
as geography, or on the background and life experiences of the
person doing the labeling. For example, someone who would likely
be perceived as a multiracial Asian/White person in San Francisco,
California, where Asian/White intermarriage is relatively common,
30. See generally Rich, supra note 20, at 1139–44 (discussing various behaviors and
other forms of self-presentation as racial signifiers).
31. Judy Scales-Trent describes the experience of “hav[ing] been at social
gatherings where I did not know a certain person was ‘black’ until they dropped
verbal markers into the conversation (‘Are you a Delta too?’).” SCALES-TRENT, supra
note 8, at 89.
32. See, e.g., Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259 (2000) (exploring how the ways in which “workplace outsiders” perform their
racial and ethnic identities affects others’ perceptions and the treatment that the
“workplace outsiders” receive).
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might simply be perceived as Asian in Charleston, West Virginia,
where there are relatively few Asians, let alone intermarriages
33
The non-physical cues I have
between Asians and Whites.
enumerated may likewise take on different significance to different
perceivers. For example, Camille Rich has discussed how a manner
of speaking that tends to be perceived as a Black dialect in the
Northeast may simply connote low socioeconomic status in the
34
South.
The perception of an individual as multiracial is fluid and
contingent, and such perception depends significantly on the
perceiver’s situation and past experiences. Thus, we must focus on
the perceiver’s perspective in examining multiracial labeling and how
such labeling may lead to discrimination. The next Part, then, takes
this perspective in examining how, once a person has come to be
perceived as racially mixed or otherwise outside of traditional racial
categories, that perception sometimes triggers animus on the part of
the perceiver. Emphasizing the perceiver’s perspective, I discuss the
historical roots of multiracial animus and its persistence in society
today.
35

II. “A MONGREL BREED OF CITIZENS” : ANIMUS AGAINST
MULTIRACIAL PEOPLE
One might argue that discrimination against multiracial people is
merely a subset—perhaps even a milder one—of discrimination
against monoracial individuals. In other words, a person who is
identified as partially Black might be subject to the same kind of
animus as one who is identified as fully Black. This Part aims to
disprove that notion and demonstrate that animus against people
identified as multiracial is a unique phenomenon.
I readily acknowledge some overlap between what we might call
monoracial and multiracial animus: a racist who dislikes people who
she views as Asian might well dislike an individual whom she

33. The 2000 Census reported that 30.8% of San Franciscans were Asian,
compared to only 1.8% of Charleston’s population. U.S. Census Bureau, American
FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov (enter “san francisco” and “california” in
“Fast Access to Information” fields; follow “San Francisco city, California” hyperlink;
select “2000” tab; repeat search for “charleston” and “west virginia”) (last visited
Feb. 3, 2010).
34. Rich, supra note 20, at 1158.
35. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955)
(per curiam).
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identifies as part-Asian for some of the same reasons. But viewing
someone as part-Asian also lends itself to unique forms of animus not
directed at those perceived as monoracial. A mixed-race person may
be viewed as polluted, defective, confusing or confused, passing,
threatening, or—in our diversity-obsessed society—as opportunistic,
gaining an advantage by identifying with a group in which he is at
best a partial member.
These negative associations may be
distinguished from those directed at people perceived as monoracial.
I use history, sociology, and jurisprudence to buttress my claim that
animus against multiracial people is a unique form of animus that is
distinguishable from animus directed at any monoracial group.
In the process, I hope to demonstrate that animus against racially
mixed individuals is anything but benign or mild.
Other scholars have attempted to illuminate the reason underlying
36
the persistent discomfort with racial mixing and racial mixedness.
My own view is that different groups’ discomfort with mixing is so
heterogeneous that any theory attempting to explain animus toward
multiracial people will by necessity be quite complicated. While I
believe that development of such a theory is an important project, it
is one I do not address in this Article. Instead, I focus on
demonstrating that racism directed at people who are viewed as
multiracial is a real phenomenon that may result in tangible negative
consequences to the lives of the people thus identified.
A. Historical Origins
Hostility toward people perceived as racially mixed has a long
pedigree in American society and is intricately interwoven with
disapproval of interracial relationships. For many years, racial mixing
between Black and White individuals was the most salient form of
mixing due to the history of slavery, and the ongoing tension
between Black and White communities yielded heightened animosity
toward Black/White mixed individuals. This focus on Black/White
mixing was reflected and reinforced by contemporaneous social
science research. As a result, the academic literature contains a more
36. See, e.g., SCALES-TRENT, supra note 8, at 57–59 (discussing incidents during
which her distinctly mixed-race physical appearance “upset [people] because there
was not a good fit between what they saw and heard, and what they expected to see
and hear”); Piper, supra note 8, at 7 (asserting that “perceptual and cognitive
distortions” result from “the failure to see any act of racist aggression as a defensive
response to one’s own perceived attack on the aggressor’s physical or psychological
property, or conception of himself or of the world”).
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thorough examination of Black/White relationships than
relationships involving other races.
While I, too, acknowledge the importance of Black/White mixing,
and while I begin my historical discussion with that relationship,
I emphasize that hostility to racial mixing and mixed-race individuals
was also directed at relationships between Whites and Native
Americans; that such hostility expanded to include Asians and
Latinos as they entered the country; and that such hostility was by no
means limited to relationships in which one partner was White.
Animus toward these other instances of racial mixing has, in my view,
received insufficient acknowledgment as a complement to the
Black/White narrative. While I therefore do my best in this Section
to examine thematically the hostility toward racial mixing among
members of all races, my efforts are somewhat limited by the
prevalence of scholarship related to the Black/White paradigm.
Likewise, my purpose is to provide a conceptual overview rather than
a comprehensive account: other scholars have explored the history
of animus toward racial mixing—at least with respect to Black/White
37
relationships—in considerable detail, which I do not replicate here.
Well into the beginning of the twentieth century, prevailing science
demonized racial mixing between Blacks and Whites as undesirable
and even dangerous. Herbert Hovenkamp draws a fine distinction
between two strains of social scientific thought regarding such racial
38
mixing. The first emphasized the role of God in creating different
races, invoking so-called natural law to predict that “ugly
consequences” would result from “any tampering—such as the
39
interbreeding of dissimilar organisms.”
The second strain of
thought, which gradually came to predominate, was driven by
40
evolutionists who emphasized the role of genetics.
These
“hereditary determinists” argued that racial mixing would “slow the
evolutionary progress of the more advanced race” and would
“increase[] the possibility of producing bizarre, unhealthy offspring .

37. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); INTERRACIALISM: BLACKWHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE AND LAW (Werner Solloers
ed., 2000); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
38. Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 624, 634 (1985).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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. . with disproportioned features, mental deficiency, weakness, and
41
disease.”
Indeed, the attitude that racially mixed individuals were defective
42
undergirded the legal prohibitions on miscegenation. Prominent
social scientists agreed that the “mulatto” was physically,
intellectually, and psychologically inferior to both Black and White
individuals. For example, Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, a well-known
professor at Harvard at the turn of the twentieth century, noted that
mulattos are “general[ly] of feeble vitality, rarely surviving beyond
43
middle age,” and that they possessed “a refinement unfitting [them]
for all work which has not a certain delicacy about it” as well as “a
44
45
Shaler’s colleagues echoed these views.
laxity of morals.”
Hovenkamp summarizes the views of Shaler and his contemporaries:
“[T]he mulatto was an outcast in both worlds—too civilized to be
comfortable with the black, but too primitive to live with the white
46
without giving offense.”
These views were reflected in popular opinion. In Rhinelander v.
47
perhaps the most sensational case involving
Rhinelander,
miscegenation, a wealthy white man sought an annulment of his
marriage on the ground of fraud after learning that his wife had
48
“colored blood.”
His attorney—a well-known and successful
member of the bar—exhorted the jury to find in his client’s favor,
urging: “[T]here isn’t a father among you [the jury members] who
would rather not see his son in his casket than to see him wedded to a
49
mulatto woman. . . . Decent blacks have the same feeling.” While
the jury ultimately found against the husband, the fact that a highly
regarded attorney conceived this argument attests to the contempt
with which many Whites viewed “mulattos”; moreover, the same
41. Id. at 634–35.
42. See Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 193–94 (explaining that court decisions often
contained rationales that expressed fear and anxiety over the possibility of interracial
relationships weakening the overall population, often using “pseudo-scientific myths”
and religious beliefs).
43. N. S. Shaler, Our Negro Types, 29 CURRENT LITERATURE 45, 46 (1900).
44. N. S. Shaler, An Ex-Southerner in South Carolina, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1870, at
53, 57.
45. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 654–55.
46. Id. at 655.
47. 219 N.Y.S. 548 (App. Div. 1927).
48. Id. at 549.
49. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v.
Rhinelander as a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 2393, 2418, 2436 (2007) (citations omitted) (providing a detailed account of
the Rhinelander case while drawing on primary sources).
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attitudes toward those perceived as racially mixed were imputed to
“decent blacks.”
Contemporaneous accounts of attitudes toward Mexican-American
immigrants reflect a similar disparaging attitude toward racial
mixture. Juan Perea has described the general contempt for the
50
Indeed, well into the
“mongrel race” of Mexican immigrants.
twentieth century, “American visitors to the Mexican frontier were
nearly unanimous in commenting on the dark skin of Mexican
mestizos who, it was generally agreed, had inherited the worst
qualities of Spaniards and Indians to produce a ‘race’ still more
51
despicable than that of either parent.” The focus, therefore, was on
the inferiority specifically produced by perceived racial mixing.
As Guadalupe Luna likewise documents, early twentieth-century texts
link immigrants’ racially mixed heritage and their perceived
52
intellectual and social shortcomings.
In 1927, one author
explained: “The Mexican ‘peon’ (Indian or mixed-breed) is a
poverty-stricken, ignorant, primitive creature, with strong muscles
and with just enough brains to obey orders and produce profits
53
under competent direction.”
Statutory law reflected this condemnation of racial mixing.
Scholars have documented the long history of anti-miscegenation
statutes in America, beginning with statutes in Maryland and Virginia
54
in the 1660s. At one point, thirty-eight states had statutes banning
55
miscegenation, and more than half of all states had retained these
56
statutes as of 1955.
Virginia’s statute, passed in 1924 and titled

50. Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 965, 975–77 (1995).
51. Id. at 976 (quoting FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF
THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 59–60 (David J. Weber ed., 1973)).
52. See Guadalupe T. Luna, “Agricultural Underdogs” and International Agreements:
The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 9
(1996) (introducing the article’s analysis of agricultural inequality by quoting early
literature that traced racial inequality to the intersection of socioeconomic status and
ethnicity).
53. Id. (quoting LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING AMERICA: THE STORY OF OUR
NATIONHOOD 214 (1927)).
54. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 66–67 (3d ed. 1992).
55. Id. at 67 (citing Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional
and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49, 50 (1964)).
56. Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1512
(2000).
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“An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity,” provides a typical example
57
demonstrating a desire to prevent racial mixing.
Moreover, even when the law did not explicitly condemn racial
mixing, it served as a tool to monitor interracial relationships.
The census and other governmental mechanisms for statistical data
collection reveal a preoccupation with what Naomi Mezey and
58
Tseming Yang have described as “policing” racial identity claims.
The intensely detailed racial classification system on census forms,
which at one point included categories such as “Quadroon” and
“Octoroon,” reflected a preoccupation with monitoring the number
and “type” of mixed race individuals with (what was perceived as)
59
scientific precision.
Against this backdrop of explicit prohibition of miscegenation and
more generalized racial monitoring, courts repeatedly upheld
60
statutes designed to prevent interracial interaction. Plessy v. Ferguson
was, of course, the seminal case, upholding “the separation of the two
races” specifically with respect to public railway cars while also
indicating that such separation was broadly constitutional in a variety
61
of contexts.
Underlying the notion of “separate but equal” was
anxiety about the potential consequences of social interaction across
racial lines, which might in turn lead to interracial relationships and
62
marriage. Given the legislature’s power to control marriage as a
vital institution central to social order, courts generally agreed that

57. Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 371, § 4, 1924 Va. Acts 534–35 (providing that a
couple could not receive a marriage license until the state verified that each
applicant’s race was pure and that it matched the other individual’s race).
58. See Naomi Mezey, supra note 7, at 1755 (framing the debate over who should
administer the census in terms of “protect[ing] a particular vision of the group
against attack from both within and without”); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and
Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 154
(1997) (noting the clash between the state’s regulatory judgment and one’s right to
“define one’s own conception of the self”).
59. In 1870, for instance, the instructions to census enumerators cautioned:
“Be particularly careful in reporting the class Mulatto. The word is here generic, and
includes quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having any perceptible trace of
African blood. Important scientific results depend upon the correct determination
of this class . . . .” See C. Matthew Snipp, Racial Measurement in the American Census:
Past Practices and Implications for the Future, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 563, 566–67 (2003)
(quoting U.S. BUREAU CENSUS, TWENTY CENSUSES: POPULATION AND HOUSING
QUESTIONS 1790–1980, at 18 (1979).
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. Id. at 550–51 (referring to the constitutionality of mandating racial
segregation in “public conveyances” generally).
62. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 634 (describing anxiety over interactions
across racial lines as grounded in either a creationist or evolutionist world view).
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the legislature reasonably exercised that power to prevent
undesirable interracial relationships and the defective offspring such
unions were believed to produce.
Several cases exemplify this form of judicial reasoning. For
63
example, in Berea College v. Commonwealth, the highest court in
Kentucky upheld the imposition of a $1000 fine on a private school
for operating a racially integrated institution in violation of a state
64
statute. The court held that “to assert separateness is not to declare
inferiority in either [race] . . . . It is simply to say that following the
order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel
65
66
these widely separate races to intermix.” Likewise, in Naim v. Naim,
a case involving a White woman and a Chinese man, the Virginia
Supreme Court upheld the state’s anti-miscegenation statute in order
67
“to preserve the racial integrity of [the state’s] citizens.” The court
emphasized the need to prevent “the corruption of blood” and
68
foreclose the genesis of “a mongrel breed of citizens.”
Similar concerns are evident in cases revoking citizenship from
White women who married men ineligible for naturalization—
primarily Asian men—based on legislation such as the Expatriation
69
70
Act of 1907 and the Cable Act of 1922. While comprehensively
documenting these events, Leti Volpp explores the marriage between
Mary Das, a White woman descended from a Mayflower passenger,
and Taraknath Das, a prominent Indian independence activist
71
residing in the United States.
While Taraknath Das successfully
naturalized in 1914, his citizenship was revoked after the Supreme
Court found that Indians were not “white” for purposes of

63. 94 S.W. 623 (Ky. 1906), aff’d, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
64. Id. at 623–24.
65. Id. at 628.
66. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam).
67. Id. at 756.
68. Id.
69. Ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (revoking citizenship from women of any race
who married male non-citizens).
70. Ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022 (ending expatriation of women who married
men eligible for citizenship while maintaining expatriation for women who married
men ineligible for naturalization); see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian
American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405,
432–34 (2005) (explaining that the Cable Act only ended expatriation for marriages
between Blacks and Whites, but had no effect on Asian-American women who had
married men ineligible for naturalization).
71. See Volpp, supra note 70, at 435–36.
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72

citizenship —leading to the revocation of Mary Das’s citizenship as
73
well.
Finally, the prohibition against miscegenation even extended
overseas. During World War II, Black American soldiers stationed in
Europe often had greater opportunity to interact and develop
romantic relationships with White European women. Nonetheless,
commanding officers continued to deny Black troops permission to
marry their European fiancées if their marriages would violate anti74
miscegenation statutes in the United States.
The distaste for multiracial people I have so far discussed is
principally that of a White ruling class concerned with the dilution of
its racial purity and the disruption of the society it controlled.
As I have mentioned, my discussion is a byproduct of the fact that this
White ruling class was the primary producer of scientific thought,
statutory provisions, and judicial decisions. But members of other
racial groups, though lacking the same access to power structures,
were not immune to the view that racial mixing would lead to
defective offspring or dilute the desirable properties of their own
race. Cornel West, for example, discusses Malcolm X’s antipathy
75
toward cultural mixing.
West explains that in the context of a
culture of White oppression and Black subordination, Malcolm X
76
viewed “mulattoes[] as symbols of weakness and confusion.”
Paradoxically, while historically many individuals believed that
multiracial people were socially inferior to members of “pure” races,
the reverse perception also inspired animus. Mixed-race people
experienced dislike from disadvantaged racial groups based upon the
perceived greater social options available to those who could claim
mixed ancestry. This animus is related to antipathy toward the
practice of “passing”—holding oneself out, explicitly or implicitly, as
77
a member of a different race.
Historically, perhaps the most
72. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1923) (“It is a matter of
familiar observation and knowledge that the physical group characteristics of the
Hindus render them readily distinguishable from the various groups of persons in
this country commonly recognized as white.”).
73. Volpp, supra note 70, at 435–36.
74. ALEX LUBIN, ROMANCE AND RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF INTERRACIAL INTIMACY
1945–1954, at 101 (2005).
75. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 103 (1993).
76. Id.
77. See Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001)
(clarifying that “passing” is a voluntary act, different from the situation in which an
individual is told he is one race when he would be considered something else if his
actual ancestry were disclosed).
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common form of passing in America involved light-skinned Blacks—
often the descendants of White slave masters and Black slaves—
passing for White in order to improve their economic opportunities
78
and social standing.
Predictably, White supremacists objected to
79
passing because it threatened notions of racial purity. But many
Blacks also objected to passing, arguing that passing was a “betrayal”
of “racial loyalty” to the Black community and that passers become
80
“complicit in the regimes that they attempt to escape.”
The negative reactions to passing relate closely to racial mixing, as
those who engaged in passing often were also perceived as racially
mixed. For example, the selection of light-skinned Homer Plessy,
who was seven-eighths White, to serve as the plaintiff in a challenge to
Virginia’s “Separate Car Law” provoked resentment from some
members of the Black community on the ground that the challenge
would represent only the interests of lighter-skinned mulattos and
was therefore “an attempt by mulattos to retain the privileges that
81
their light skin had previously afforded.”
Light-skinned Blacks
experienced hostility even when they did not fully pass. As Trina
Jones has explained, in the early 1900s, “[a]lthough the mulatto elite
were generally in a higher socioeconomic class than unmixed Blacks
due to their historically favored status . . . their lighter skin and better
socioeconomic status spawned resentment within the Black
82
community.” Racial mixedness thus engendered animus from both
advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups.
Ultimately, courts invalidated legal prohibitions against racial
83
mixing. In 1948, in Perez v. Sharp, the California Supreme Court
struck down the state’s anti-miscegenation statute in the face of a
84
challenge brought by a Latina woman and a Black man. And in
1967, the Supreme Court followed suit in Loving v. Virginia, holding
that statutes prohibiting miscegenation were unconstitutional on the

78. Id. at 1157.
79. Id. at 1157–58 (noting that the threat focused mostly on an unsuspecting
White person marrying a Black person “passing” as White).
80. Id. at 1158, 1175.
81. Mark Golub, Plessy as “Passing”: Judicial Responses to Ambiguously Raced Bodies
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 563, 563, 571 (2005).
82. Jones, supra note 56, at 1517; see also id. at 1518–21 (documenting the various
ways in which “the dominant preference operates in favor of lighter skin tones”
among Blacks, just as it does among Whites).
83. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
84. Id. at 29 (holding that California’s miscegenation law was too vague to be
enforced and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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ground that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
85
Constitution. Now, more than four decades after that decision, one
might hope that animus against mixed-race people would be virtually
nonexistent, particularly in an era when multiracial people and
families appear regularly on our movie screens and televisions and
when our forty-fourth president is the son of a Black man from Kenya
86
and a White woman from Kansas.
Surely social attitudes have
evolved toward tolerance, but Loving and the other race-related civil
rights gains of the 1960s have not fully dissipated animus against
those identified as racially mixed. The next Section discusses the
continuing discomfort with interracial relationships and the offspring
of such relationships.
B. Contemporary Attitudes
The phenomenon now known as the multiracial identity
movement has undoubtedly shaped our current attitudes toward
racial mixing and multiracial people. Two events paved the way for
this movement. The first was the Loving decision, described above,
which removed legal obstacles to intermarriage between individuals
87
of different races. The other event was the decision of the Bureau
of the Census to discontinue the practice of having a census
enumerator visually determine the races of people surveyed in the
88
census. In 1960, the Bureau instead began to ask the head of the
89
To governmental
household to fill out the census form.
demographers, race thus became a feature of how an individual
(or, at least, the head of the individual’s household) perceived
himself, rather than a product of how outsiders (such as census
enumerators) perceived that individual.
85. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
86. Interestingly, Barack Obama is not the first president to claim racially mixed
ancestry. Bill Clinton also described himself as a “multiracial American” because
some of his ancestors were Native American. Reynolds Farley, Racial Identities in
2000: The Response to the Multiple-Race Response Option, in THE NEW RACE QUESTION,
supra note 6, at 37.
87. For example, post-Loving, the number of Black/White married couples living
in the United States increased over 600% in less than twenty years, with the number
of Black/White offspring increasing more than seven-fold between 1968 and 1994.
Patrick F. Linehan, Thinking Outside of the Box: The Multiracial Category and Its
Implications for Race Identity Development, 44 HOW. L.J. 43, 47–48 (2000).
88. See Snipp, supra note 59, at 569 (explaining that the role of the census
enumerator was reduced after a large undercounting of minority populations was
discovered).
89. Id.
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These two events—the Loving decision and the census
modification—laid the groundwork for the multiracial identity
movement. Reynolds Farley has noted that, “[a]s early as the
1950s, married interracial couples had organized clubs in Detroit,
Los Angeles, and New York to support one another and their mixed90
race children.” But multiracial identity groups first gained broader
recognition as a social movement in the 1970s and 1980s. A group
called Interracial Intercultural Pride (“I-Pride”) formed in the 1970s
“to convince the Berkeley public schools to include an ‘interracial’
91
category on official forms.”
The Association of MultiEthnic
Americans, which was created from an alliance of I-Pride and several
other grassroots organizations, also increasingly lobbied for political
92
and legal recognition. In 1988, an Atlanta woman who objected to
the Georgia public school system’s classification of her children and
other mixed-raced children solely as Black, regardless of their
preferences or their parents’ preferences, formed an organization
93
called Reclassify All Children Equally.
Several other multiracial
94
advocacy groups subsequently emerged.
By 1990, although the census still instructed people to check one
box that best described their race, over half a million people
95
explicitly disobeyed these instructions by picking two or more races.
In 1992, nearly 400 multiracial and biracial individuals attended the
“Loving Conference,” which was “the first national gathering of the
96
multiracial community.”
Although the multiracial identity
movement failed to induce the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget to include a “multiracial” category on the 2000 census, that
census did, for the first time, allow individuals to select more than

90. Farley, supra note 86, at 34.
91. See Mezey, supra note 7, at 1749 (noting that while I-Pride successfully forced
the change in Berkley public schools, the state refused to use a classification system
that conflicted with the federal system).
92. Id. The founder of this organization, a San Francisco attorney who identified
as both White and Mexican, even considered filing suits about the single-race
classification system on the 1990 census but was unable to locate qualified plaintiffs.
Farley, supra note 86, at 34–35.
93. Farley, supra note 86, at 34.
94. See id. at 35 (highlighting mixed-race support groups such as “A Place for Us,”
the “Brick by Brick Church,” the “Interracial Family Alliance,” and the “Interracial
Lifestyle Connection”).
95. Wendy D. Roth, The End of the One-Drop Rule? Labeling of Multiracial Children
in Black Intermarriages, 20 SOC. F. 35, 38 (2005).
96. Gilanshah, supra note 7, at 183–84.
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97

one racial category to describe themselves. Multiracial individuals
98
have also received legislative attention at the state level, and the
99
number of self-identified multiracial people continues to increase.
Despite the multiracial identity movement, animus toward people
perceived as racially mixed lingers in society and, indeed, has
mutated to take on new forms. As previously discussed, attitudes
toward multiracial people are linked to perceptions of interracial
relationships.
Although one might hypothesize a racist who
vehemently opposes interracial relationships but has no problem with
the offspring of those relationships, in practice, the coexistence of
such attitudes seems unlikely. A more plausible notion is that the
multiracial person is targeted for disapproval for reasons similar to
the reasons that motivate disapproval of interracial relationships.
As detailed below, the fact that many Americans continue to view
such relationships with suspicion and disapproval is indicative of how
those same Americans view multiracial individuals.
Polling indicates that reservations regarding interracial
relationships linger. For example, a 2007 study by the Pew Institute
found that eighty-three percent of a representative sample of
Americans agreed with the statement: “[I]t’s all right for blacks and

97. Joel Perlmann & Mary C. Waters, Introduction to THE NEW RACE QUESTION,
supra note 6, at 1.
98. Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio all have passed
multiracial category legislation. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-135 (1994) (requiring a
multiracial category on state forms used for reporting racial data to federal
agencies); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.111 (West 2006) (requiring a multiracial
category on all forms used by the State Board of Education to gather data relating to
racial categories); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-15-5.1-6.5 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring a
multiracial category for some forms used by public agencies); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV’T, § 10-606(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring a multiracial category for any
form that requires identification of individuals by race); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 37.2202a (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring public agency forms that request racial
information to include a multiracial category); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.941
(LexisNexis 2009) (requiring a multiracial category on forms that collect racial data).
Florida and North Carolina have administratively mandated a multiracial category,
and legislators have introduced multiracial category bills in California,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 65.
99. One projection suggests that by 2050, 17.8% of the population will be of
mixed ancestry—a figure that includes 87.8% of “American Indians,” 27.6% of
“Asians and Pacific Islanders,” 22.7% of “African Americans,” 45.4% of “Hispanics,”
and 19.1% of “Whites.” Barry Edmonston et al., Recent Trends in Intermarriage and
Immigration and Their Effects on the Future Racial Composition of the U.S. Population, in
THE NEW RACE QUESTION, supra note 6, at 246–47 tbl.9.8. The same projection
predicts that by 2100, 34.2% of the total population will be of mixed ancestry. Id.
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100

whites to date.” Therefore, by logical extension, seventeen percent
of the population has some sort of reservation about Blacks and
Whites dating, let alone marrying and having children. Another Pew
study conducted in March 2008 asked a representative sample of
White Democrats whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement: It’s “[a]ll right for blacks and whites to date each other.”
Thirteen percent of study participants stated that they “disagree[d]”;
twenty-four percent stated that they “mostly agree[d]”; and sixty-one
101
percent “completely agree[d].”
While a majority of respondents
therefore expressed no concern about interracial dating, the survey
nonetheless indicates that more than one-third of self-identified
White Democrats have at least some hesitation about dating
relationships between Blacks and Whites (let alone relationships
involving marriage and children) and are willing to say so to a phone
surveyor.
Likewise, a 2001 survey of interracial couples found that, while the
majority felt that their relationship was accepted by their families and
friends, many couples believed that marrying someone of a different
102
race makes marriage more difficult.
Indeed, sixty-five percent of
couples in Black/White partnerships and twenty-four percent of
Asian/White and Latino/White couples said that at least one set of
103
parents initially objected to the relationship.
In a companion
survey, nearly half of the White individuals surveyed stated that it was
104
Thus,
“better” for people to marry someone of their own race.
regardless of the precise numbers, these surveys demonstrate that
many Americans retain some level of discomfort with the notion of
racial mixing.
This antipathy toward interracial relationships mirrors the hostility
105
directed at people viewed as racially mixed. The sheer number of
100. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, The Databank, 83%-Approve
Interracial Dating, http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=285
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
101. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Obama Weathers the Wright
Storm, Clinton Faces Credibility Problem, Mar. 27, 2008, http://peoplepress.org/report/?pageid=1281.
102. Darryl Fears & Claudia Deane, Biracial Couples Report Tolerance, WASH. POST,
July 5, 2001, at A1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. I note that people who experience hostility because they are viewed as
multiracial may also experience hostility because they are viewed as monoracial.
For example, someone who is subject to hostility as a biracial Black/White person
might also be subject to hostility as a White person from Black people and as a Black
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slurs specifically designated for multiracial individuals attests to such
106
While it is unnecessary to catalog each permutation of
animus.
perceived racial mixing and the specific hostility it engenders,
I discuss some of the common themes and provide a few examples of
how these themes play out in specific communities.
People viewed as multiracial are subject to simultaneous, and
sometimes conflicting, criticism from various angles. As David Theo
Goldberg has observed, “there is no single unified phenomenon of
107
racism, only a range of racisms.”
A person may simultaneously
suffer “rejection for refusing to assimilate” from a majority group and
be “challenge[d] [by a minority group] as an ‘imposter’ out for
108
personal gain through such programs as affirmative action.”
Members of an in-group may shun a person perceived as multiracial
as less than a full-status member of that group. A person perceived as
multiracial may be subjected to what Adrian Piper has termed the
“Suffering Test”—recitation from an in-group member of
experiences of racism, followed by trivialization of the multiracial
109
person’s own experiences with racism. Or a multiracial person may
simply be asked to justify his claim to membership in any group with
110
which he might choose to identify.
Kevin Johnson has explored the experience of people perceived to
be mixed Latino and White, observing that “Latinos of mixed
heritage at various times feel less than fully accepted by the Latino
community[,]” but that “being rejected by Latinos does not
111
necessarily mean full acceptance by Anglos.”
He explains that,
from non-Latinos, “light-skinned Mexican-Americans may suffer
‘microaggressions,’ such as racial insults of Mexican-Americans in
person from White people. See Piper, supra note 8, at 6–7 (decrying the experience
of having Blacks transfer their hostility from recent experiences with racist Whites to
the author as a Black who looked White). While my focus is on discrimination
against those viewed as multiracial, these other motivations for discrimination may
provide an additional gloss on the discriminatory narrative in some instances.
106. A few examples (listed roughly in order of ascending creativity) include:
“mulatto”; “half-breed”; “zebra”; “mutt”; “mongrel”; “cholo”; “halfrican”; “oreo”;
“chigger”; “jewgaboo.” I collected these terms from various sources, including cases,
articles, and discussions with colleagues. See generally NationMaster.com, http://
www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Ethnic-slurs#M (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
107. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 213 (1993).
108. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1288.
109. Piper, supra note 8, at 7.
110. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1311 (“My experience has been that others await
an explanation when I claim to be Mexican-American.”).
111. Id. at 1293.
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112

their presence.” His example illustrates the distinction between the
treatment a mixed-identified person and a Latino-identified person
would receive: An insult of Mexican-Americans in front of a
mixed-identified, light-skinned Mexican-American constitutes a
“microaggression,” perhaps a means of testing his racial
commitments or a means of daring him to “out” himself as Latino.
But the same comment made in front of a person unequivocally
identified as Mexican would be an unambiguously aggressive insult
based on race. In either instance, the comment contributes to a
racially hostile environment, but the two narratives are
distinguishable.
Moreover, individuals subject to such
microaggressions also “may be challenged by their fellow Mexican113
Americans as being ‘too White.’” Johnson explains that “[t]he term
gabacho, slang for Anglo,” is sometimes directed at individuals viewed
114
as mixed as a means of exclusion.
Likewise, in some Asian communities—particularly, though not
exclusively, within those that are relatively insular and are comprised
of recent immigrants—the prevailing belief is that marriage between
Asians and members of other races is undesirable. A 1998 study
found that sixty-nine percent of Chinese-American parents agreed
with the statement, “I would prefer that my children marry someone
in the same ethnic group,” and fifty percent of younger Chinese
Americans who were not yet parents also agreed with that
115
statement.
According to sociologist Betty Lee Sung, interracial
marriage is “the worst thing that could happen” for many Asian
116
parents.
Such resistance to interracial marriage is linked to the
undesirability of multiracial children. As Frank Wu explains, “[e]ach
117
set of would-be in-laws may want grandchildren who ‘look like us.’”
Less academic research has explored Asians’ attitudes regarding
racial mixing, perhaps in part because linguistic obstacles make such
communities less accessible to a primarily White legal academy.
But such attitudes are common knowledge within some communities.
112. Id. at 1292.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. FLAVIA TAM ET AL., INTER-GENERATIONAL PAPER ON ASIAN AMERICAN ATTITUDES
TOWARDS FAMILY VALUES, INTERRACIAL DATING AND MARRIAGE 7 (1998).
116. Barbara Kantrowitz, The Ultimate Assimilation, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 80.
117. FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 282
(2002). Wu recalls asking his mother whether she would love him if he married an
American girl; his mother stated that she would, but responded that “she would love
[him] more if [he] married a Chinese girl.” Id. at 261.
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A recent thread on the Asian-themed website “Yellowworld Forums”
discussed whether “hapas” (mixed-race Asians) who look “more
Asian” experience more or less racism than those who are “just
118
Asian.”
One commenter who identified herself as half-white and
half-Japanese explained:
I’m definitely a more Asian looking hapa. But ironically, I feel
more racism and discrimination and whatnot from full Asians than
I do from non-Asians. I don’t know if this is because of my height
and size or my very non-stereotypical Asian culture and look. But I
definitely feel a little bit [more] uncomfortable or judged in a
restaurant or store full of Asians than in one with a mixture of non119
Asian and Asian races.

Another commenter agreed that she “had the impression my hapa
friends have gotten more crap from other Asians than they have from
120
whites.” And a third explained: “All’s well so long as the subject of
my ‘other half’ doesn’t enter into the conversation. If it does, some
of my friends’ Asian friends’ perceptions change. They’ll still be
polite and all, but you can almost feel like they think that I’m not one
121
of them.” Thus, while understudied in the academic literature, the
hostility of some Asian communities to interracial relationships is
supported by anecdotal evidence and is surely worthy of a more
detailed examination.
Animus toward people viewed as racially mixed evokes the
122
criticisms of “passing” that have been voiced in decades past.
For example, Randall Kennedy links historical opposition to passing
with contemporary resistance to Black/White intermarriage and the
opposition to a multiracial census category. Some members of the
Black community, he writes, “see these activities as kindred to passing
and condemn them as ‘escapist,’ ‘inauthentic,’ even ‘fraudulent’

118. Yellowworld Forums, http://forums.yellowworld.org/archive/index.php?t11424.html.
119. Posting of hapakristina to Yellowworld Forums, http://forums.yellow
world.org/archive/index.php?t-11424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 15:00 EST). She later
added: “I’ve been labeled a sell-out . . . a wannabe Asian, ugly, a disgrace. Many,
many things, and my ex’s mother didn’t like the fact that a possible mixed nonKorean, non-full Asian was possibly entering her family.” Id. at 20:20 EST.
The comments drawn from Yellowworld Forums have been edited for capitalization,
spelling, and punctuation to make them more readable.
120. Posting of AngryABCGirl to Yellowworld Forums, http://forums.yellow
world.org/archive/index.php?t-11424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 15:36 EST).
121. Posting of Emperor_Mike to Yellowworld Forums, http://forums.yellow
world.org/archive/index.php?t-11424.html (Dec. 8, 2003, 16:09 EST).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 77–82.
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efforts that will lead to a debilitating ‘whitening’ of what should be an
123
The negative
authentically ‘black’ African American community.”
reaction of the Black community to Tiger Woods’s description of
124
himself as “Cablinasian,” rather than Black, is simply one example.
But multiracial animus as an iteration of antipathy toward passing is
hardly limited to the traditional Black/White binary. Rather, hostility
toward individuals perceived as attempting to pass—perhaps by
asserting a multiracial identity—might be expressed by a member of
any racial category. Those seen as multiracial may be viewed as
perpetrators of “racial desertion” based on the view, correct or
otherwise, that they are attempting to opt out of a monoracial group
125
to which they owe an intrinsic loyalty.
Hostility toward people seen as employing their mixed-race identity
to reap social advantage has in some ways intensified with the ascent
of the multiracial identity movement. In the context of higher
education, several scholars have raised the concern that mixed-race
people may be checking the application-form boxes corresponding to
underrepresented racial groups solely to gain advantage in the
126
admissions process.
The extent of such academic opportunism is
unclear, but the possibility undoubtedly engenders resentment.
Many scholars have attested to firsthand experience with this hostility.
Kevin Johnson explains that “one fears being accused of claiming to
be a minority—sometimes by members of the very group with which
127
he or she identifies—simply to obtain a ‘special’ preference.”
Adrian Piper likewise describes repeated incidents of skepticism
123. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1187–88. I emphasize that I do not claim that
individuals who oppose a multiracial census category would necessarily discriminate
against individuals who they viewed either as multiracial or as attempting to claim a
multiracial identity. My point is simply that, just as passing motivated hostility toward
passers, so might perception of an individual as multiracial motivate hostility toward
that individual under some circumstances.
124. See Gary Kamiya, Cablinasian Like Me, SALON, Apr. 30, 1997,
http://www.salon.com/april97/tiger970430.html (noting that Woods’s selfidentification “infuriated many African Americans who . . . see him as a traitor,” and
that “[s]ome blacks saw Woods’ [sic] assertion of a multiracial identity as a sellout
that could touch off an epidemic of ‘passing’”).
125. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1187.
126. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1141, 1215–18 (2007) (describing fraud and concealment as two types of racial
manipulation schemes); Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy,
43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 2074 (1996) (stating that the problem of identity fraud
“is much less common in the race context [than the religious context], though it
arises in situations involving either mixed parentage or hard-to-define classifications
such as Hispanic”).
127. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1268.
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regarding her race, including an academic colleague who “grilled”
her regarding her self-identification as Black and what fraction
128
She summarizes: “The implicit
“African” ancestry she had.
accusation . . . was, of course, that I had fraudulently posed as black
in order to take advantage of the department’s commitment to
129
affirmative action.”
The news also contains a wide array of examples of antipathy
toward interracial families and multiracial people. Recently released
tapes reveal former President Nixon making the following statement
to an aide following the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v.
130
Wade : “There are times when an abortion is necessary. I know that.
131
When you have a black and a white . . . [o]r a rape.” In 1992, the
volunteer coordinator of Pat Buchanan’s Republican presidential
campaign in New Jersey was removed after he compared mixed
132
marriages to the cross-breeding of animals.
In Alabama in 2000,
about forty percent of voters opposed a symbolic repeal of Alabama’s
133
unquestionably unconstitutional anti-miscegenation statute.
More
recently, a principal in Alabama threatened to cancel his school’s
134
prom if interracial couples attended. When a student who was half
Black and half White asked him who she should go with, he
reportedly stated: “That’s the problem. Your mom and dad
135
shouldn’t have had you. You were a mistake.”
Although the
principal was suspended by a vote of four to two for his remarks,
three years later he was popularly elected and inducted as
136
superintendant of the school district.
Just within the past year, a
mixed-race family in Oregon decided to move to a different
neighborhood to protect their four- and two-year-old daughters after
suffering repeated instances of racial intimidation, including having

128. Piper, supra note 8, at 9.
129. Id.
130. 410 U.S. 113.
131. Charlie Savage, On Nixon Tapes, Ambivalence over Abortion, Not Watergate, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2009, at A1.
132. Buchanan Aide is Removed over Mixed-Marriage View, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at
A14.
133. Elizabeth Becker et al., The 2000 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2000, at B15.
134. Ronald Smothers, Principal Causes Furor on Mixed-Race Couples, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1994, at A16.
135. Id.
136. Russ Jamieson, Alabama Town Fears New School Superintendant’s Alleged
Bigotry, CNN INTERACTIVE, July 2, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/US/9707/02/
humphries.return/index.html.
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the words “KKK” and an obscenity spelled out in gasoline on their
137
street, and in Buffalo in 2009, an individual whom authorities
described as a “white supremacist” pled guilty to felony charges
stemming from burning a cross on the lawn of the home of a mixed138
race couple consisting of a Puerto Rican man and a White woman.
Most recently, in October 2009, Louisiana Justice of the Peace
Keith Bardwell made national headlines after refusing to marry an
139
interracial couple.
Bardwell, who has since resigned, reportedly
refused to marry at least four other interracial couples over the past
140
two and a half years. When asked his reasons for refusing to marry
the couple, he explained that “he was concerned for the children
that might be born of the relationship and that, in his experience,
141
most interracial marriages don’t last.”
Bardwell further
emphasized: “I’m not a racist. . . . I do ceremonies for black couples
142
right here in my house. My main concern is for the children.”
It is worth noting that identification as a multiracial person may
yield certain arguably positive consequences as well as harms.
A person labeled multiracial—say, the daughter of a Vietnamese
father and Irish mother—may be viewed as “exotic” while one labeled
monoracial—the American-born daughter of two Vietnamese
immigrants—is still perceived as “foreign.” Indeed, certain segments
of society fetishize the “unusual” physical features of the “ethnically
ambiguous” with many advertising campaigns that intentionally
employ models with “racially indeterminate features” that “reflect[] a
143
current fascination with the racial hybrid.”
Yet this exoticization
can be a double-edged sword. Elizabeth Emens notes our “mixed
reaction” to those who prefer individuals with certain racial
characteristics, noting that it is telling that in such circumstances we

137. Anita Burke, Hate Crime Suspect Jailed, S. OR. MAIL TRIBUNE, May 31, 2008,
available at http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080531/
NEWS/805310308.
138. Aaron Besecker, Suspect Admits Guilt in Hate Crime, BUFFALO NEWS CITY &
REGION, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/story/
589559.html.
139. Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN, Nov. 3, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/index.html.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Ruth La Ferla, Generation E.A.: Ethnically Ambiguous, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2003, § 9.
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apply the “language of having a ‘fetish’ as opposed to a ‘type.’”
Exoticism, Emens concludes, is complicated: “If one is to be treated
as a thing, one would rather be treated as a rare and pretty thing than
as a disgusting or dangerous one. But that is still to be treated as a
145
thing.”
The dubious advantage associated with this exoticization
notwithstanding, people identified as racially mixed are subject to a
complex and multifaceted web of negative responses from society,
ranging from discomfort to distaste to outright hostility. These
negative responses are rooted in a long history of dislike for
miscegenation and have so far survived—and, in some ways, perhaps
have even been exacerbated by—the multiracial identity movement.
The negative responses are not suppressed; rather, they manifest
themselves in a variety of situations.
Unsurprisingly, given these various forms of social disapprobation,
federal case law includes many narratives that reflect hostility toward
interracial relationships and racial mixing. I want to distinguish
clearly, however, between cases incidentally describing animus toward
those perceived as multiracial—of which there are many—and cases
actually brought by multiracial plaintiffs—of which there are
extraordinarily few, a phenomenon that serves as the starting point
for Part III. I discuss the former species of case here—those in which
the factual background reveals animus against those individuals
perceived as racially mixed though the case itself does not address a
claim of multiracial discrimination. For example, an employee seen
as monoracial may be harassed on the basis of his association with a
biracial person, often his child.
146
A paradigmatic example is Defoe v. Spiva, in which the court
describes an incident during a high school basketball game where
students threw Oreos onto the court when a biracial student entered
147
the game.
The case, however, did not actually involve a claim by
the biracial student; rather, the plaintiff was a student who claimed

144. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1343 (2009) (exploring intimate discrimination
in the context of racial, sexual, and (dis)ability based preferences).
145. Id. at 1344 (quoting PHYLLIS ROSE, JAZZ CLEOPATRA: JOSEPHINE BAKER IN HER
TIME 44 (1989)).
146. No. 3:06-CV-450, 2008 WL 80258 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2008).
147. Id. at *2.
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that his First Amendment rights were violated by the school’s
148
prohibition on clothing bearing the confederate flag.
149
In Green v. Franklin National Bank, a black plaintiff filed a Title VII
claim against her employer, claiming that her termination was
150
motivated by racial animus. To buttress her claims of bigotry in her
work environment, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the bank’s
vice president told the plaintiff’s direct supervisor, who “is a woman
151
of African-American and Caucasian heritage,” that she would have
expected the mixed-race manager’s “son to have blue eyes like his
152
father.”
When the supervisor stated that her son had brown eyes,
the vice president asked, “[D]oes that mean she [sic] is full of shit
153
The vice president made other comments about the
like you?”
mixed-race supervisor’s children, including, “[S]o you have poo poo
154
kids too.”
155
Wheaton v. North Oakland Medical Center likewise paints a troubling
picture of animus against multiracial individuals. In that case,
a White plaintiff who worked in a predominantly Black division
156
brought a claim of employment discrimination.
The plaintiff
testified that her coworker described her daughter, whose father is
157
Black, as a “half-breed.”
Other coworkers also made disparaging
comments about the plaintiff’s interracial relationship and left an
email in her desk drawer containing a magazine article condemning
158
relationships between White women and Black men.
159
In Madison v. IBP, Inc., the plaintiff’s coworkers also expressed
animus against her children specifically because the children were
160
seen as mixed-race. The plaintiff, “a Caucasian woman married to
an African American man,” presented “detailed evidence” of “an
148. Id. at *1.
149. 459 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
150. Id. at 906.
151. Id. at 907.
152. Id. at 910.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 130 F. App’x 773 (6th Cir. 2005).
156. Id. at 776–77.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 777–78.
159. 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003).
160. Id. at 1053. The district court included additional details, such as the fact
that a coworker referred to the plaintiff’s children as “monkeys” and “zebras,” asked
her “what are you doing with a fucking nigger having fucking nigger babies,” and
asserted that “niggers and whites should stay with their own.” Madison v. IBP, Inc.,
149 F. Supp. 2d 730, 752 (S.D. Iowa 1999).
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unusual record of pervasive harassment” based both on her sex and
161
Her coworkers made derogatory and
on her “interracial family.”
racist comments about her husband and children, stating that she
had “‘ruined herself’ by marrying a black man and having biracial
162
children.”
While Defoe, Green, Wheaton, and Madison offer a few examples of
hostility directed at those perceived as multiracial, they are far from
idiosyncratic. Many other federal cases describe animus against
163
interracial relationships and the children born of such unions.
161. Madison, 330 F.3d at 1053.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 131–32, 134 (2d Cir. 2008)
(denying summary judgment to the defendants where a White basketball coach
married to a Black woman was fired after his supervisor called him “nigger lover” and
asked whether he was “going to marry that Aunt Jemima”); Austin v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
67 F. App’x 956, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing a complaint by a female forklift
driver—who kept a picture of her biracial child on her forklift—that she was fired
after complaining about a coworker’s derogatory racial comments about her child);
Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d
988, 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that an individual brought a cognizable Title
VII claim when he alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action because he
had a biracial daughter); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d
581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that a White woman stated an employment
discrimination claim on the ground that she was fired for dating a Black man),
vacated in part on other grounds by 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Parr v. Woodmen of
the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
White salesman stated a cognizable claim by alleging failure to hire based on his
marriage to a Black woman); Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 WL
4093352, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008) (noting that coworkers expressed
disapproval of the relationship between a White prison worker and a Black former
inmate); Frazier v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:07-0818, 2008 WL 2781665, at *1–2
(M.D. Tenn. July 14, 2008) (noting that a White female prison employee was
harassed by Black coworkers after her marriage to a Black man and that, when she
reported the harassment, her supervisor told her that “there were things she had to
expect” regarding her marriage); Kanitz v. Cooke, No. 03-10180, 2008 WL 2199672,
at *1–2, 7 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2008) (holding that, where a Black prisoner brought
suit alleging that he and his White girlfriend (as well as other interracial couples)
were treated with greater suspicion during visiting hours, “plaintiffs have alleged
violation of a clearly established constitutional right—the right to be free from
disparate treatment based on their status as a mixed-race couple”); Campbell v.
Bradshaw, No. 2:05-cv-193, 2007 WL 4991266, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2007)
(describing a biracial convicted prisoner’s experience of racial harassment, including
frequently being called “half breed” and “zebra,” and finding that confusion about
his racial identity led to “self-esteem problems, alienation, anger, poor selfconfidence, and isolation”); Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd., No. 05 C 0348,
2006 WL 1519320, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006) (describing the defendant’s
derogatory comments about the plaintiff’s son, which included calling him both
“nigger” and “biracial boy,” and stating pejoratively that “she [the plaintiff] has this
biracial boy running around”); EEOC v. Foodcrafters Distrib. Co., No. Civ. 032796(RBK), 2006 WL 489718, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006) (describing harassment
experienced by a White plaintiff after coworkers learned she had a biracial child);
Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00-6134-CV-SJ-GAF, 2006 WL 223111, at *6 (W.D.
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State court cases likewise evidence animus against multiracial
164
people. In Loeffelman v. Board of Education, an eighth-grade English
teacher brought a First Amendment claim challenging her
termination for making derogatory comments about biracial
165
children.
She stated that “mixed children” are “racially confused”
and “dirty”; that they “come to school with ‘dirty little faces and their
hair never combed properly’”; and that “a female in an interracial
relationship should have herself ‘fixed’ so she can never have
166
children.”
Her comments were delivered in front of biracial
students during regular school hours, and the students later testified
to the psychological harm they suffered as a result of her
167
comments.
The court ultimately rejected the teacher’s claim that
her remarks were made in her private capacity and therefore were
168
protected by the First Amendment.
While Loeffelman is an
unusually explicit example, state court case law also contains many
examples of hostility to racial mixing in cases involving employment
169
170
171
discrimination, housing discrimination, and child custody.

Mo. Jan. 30, 2006) (describing a religious organization known as the “Christian
Separatist Church” which “mandate[s] . . . absolute racial separation” and forbids
“African-Americans, Jews, and ‘mongrels’” from membership as enforcement of the
organization’s belief that “the Sixth Commandment is translated as ‘You will not
mongrelize’”); Monley v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1156 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (describing a female employee’s allegation that she was terminated because
she was involved in an interracial relationship and had a biracial child); Rosenblatt v.
Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F. Supp. 298, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the
plaintiff’s allegation that he was discriminated against as a result of his marriage to a
Black woman).
164. 134 S.W.3d 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
165. Id. at 639.
166. Id. at 641.
167. Id. at 644.
168. Id. at 645–46.
169. See Gonzalez v. Rinard, No. E041658, 2008 WL 257443, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2008) (noting that a boss involved in a romantic relationship with an
employee called her a “Nigger lover” because she was the single mother of a mixedrace child); Ky. Lottery Corp. v. Riles, No. 2004-CA-001053-MR, 2007 WL 1785451, at
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2007) (noting, in the course of upholding a jury verdict for
the plaintiff on a claim of racial employment discrimination, that a Black plaintiff’s
supervisors made disparaging remarks about his Black/Filipino mixed-race children
and stated that his speech was “too black”); Boggs v. Phillip S. Van Embden, P.C.,
No. L-00257-03, 2005 WL 3158037, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 29, 2005)
(describing a White plaintiff’s allegations that her boss expressed hostility to mixedrace intimacy—by questioning why no one had told him her children were biracial
after seeing a photograph of them, by asking her whether a group of Black high
school boys knew her children’s father or whether she had dated them, and by
stating that “he didn’t understand why white girls would go with black men”—and
holding the allegations insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Hunt v. Trumbull
Cmty. Action Program, No. 2005-T-0036, 2006 WL 847225, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
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My point in detailing instances of animus toward racial mixing
from federal and state case law is not to provide an exhaustive catalog
of such incidents. Rather, I simply wish to establish that judges are
not blind to such animus—in fact, they regularly encounter it and
describe it in their opinions.
These examples, therefore,
demonstrate that judges are aware of mixed-race discrimination.
Indeed, judicial oblivion is particularly unlikely given the many news
172
stories that describe hatred directed at multiracial individuals.
In sum, overwhelming evidence indicates that animus against
people identified as multiracial persists. Such animus is distinct from
animus directed at members of monoracial groups, and multiracial
animus is even discussed in many judicial opinions. Yet this animus
does not manifest itself in antidiscrimination claims brought by
people identified as mixed-race. The next Part discusses the dearth
of claims in which a plaintiff alleges multiracial discrimination and
traces the reasons underlying the absence of such claims.
173

III. “DISCRETE AND INSULAR” : THE PROBLEM WITH CATEGORIES
Only a handful of race discrimination cases have been brought by
plaintiffs explicitly identified as multiracial. Given the overwhelming
evidence of animus against multiracial individuals discussed in Part
II, it would be naïve to theorize that multiracial people simply do not
suffer from racist treatment. Rather, I argue that plaintiffs seldom
31, 2006) (noting that an employee’s “African-American supervisor told her that she
did not believe that it was right that she had biracial children”).
170. See Matteo v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 761 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div.
2003) (noting that the landlord refused to rent to mixed-race couples); Hobbs Realty
& Constr. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 593 S.E.2d 103, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (noting
that the landlords refused to give a key to their tenants’ biracial adult daughter and
her three friends (two White, one Black) and that they used a racial epithet); Allison
v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 716 A.2d 689, 690 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (noting
that the landlord told prospective tenants that she “had to be leery of mixed couples”
because her current tenants might move out); W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n v.
Wilson Estates, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 6, 11 (W. Va. 1998) (noting that the White woman
tenant was evicted for having mixed-race guests).
171. See Dansby v. Dansby, 189 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
evidence that a father was teaching discrimination by objecting to his ex-wife dating
White men and thus exposing the children to a “biracial situation”). However, the
dissenting opinion contended that the majority was ignoring the racism that the
father was instilling in the children—for example, the older daughter was
“embarrassed” to see her mother in a restaurant with a White man, suggesting that
she had already internalized her father’s racist norms, while the younger daughter
was simply “confused.” Id. at 483 (Pittman, J., dissenting).
172. See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (collecting examples of
mixed-race animus in the news).
173. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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allege multiracial discrimination because antidiscrimination
jurisprudence is premised upon the existence of clearly drawn racial
categories. Indeed, proof of discrimination generally requires
individuals to show that they were treated worse due to their
membership in some category as compared to people outside that
category. This dependence on categories renders antidiscrimination
jurisprudence inhospitable to people identified and discriminated
against as multiracial. Because their ascribed racial identity does not
fit neatly into conventional categories, they cannot deploy those
categories as a means to demonstrate the racist treatment they
suffered.
This Part first briefly summarizes the categorical foundations of
our antidiscrimination jurisprudence. It then describes the few cases
where individuals specifically identified as multiracial have brought
antidiscrimination claims, and demonstrates the tension between
those claims and the categorical model. To resolve that tension,
courts have generally reformulated claims of discrimination brought
by multiracial people to comport with the categorical model, and
have acknowledged multiracial discrimination only when the facts
leave no other alternative.
A. Categorical Foundations
Our antidiscrimination jurisprudence is built around the existence
of clear categories. In 1938, Justice Stone, writing for the majority in
174
United States v. Carolene Products Co., left open the question of
“whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
175
judicial inquiry.” The famous Carolene Products footnote generated
an entire jurisprudence in which protection of an individual against
discrimination depended on whether that individual fell into a
“discrete” category—one for which the very terminology implies that
the category is straightforward and has distinct boundaries.
The Supreme Court soon directed the “more searching judicial
inquiry” of Carolene Products at racial categories. The Court’s first
explicit reference to race as a “suspect” class for discrimination
174. 304 U.S. 144.
175. Id. at 152 n.4.
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176

occurred in Korematsu v. United States. Ironically, Korematsu reached
the rare conclusion that a classification that imposed a disadvantage
177
But more importantly
based on race could survive strict scrutiny.
for present purposes, Justice Black’s opinion accepted the categorical
nature of race without question: “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional . . . . Pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
178
restrictions . . . .” Indeed, Justice Murphy’s dissent, while protesting
the majority decision to uphold the internment of individuals with
Japanese ancestry, parallels the majority in conflating race and
179
national origin while asserting the categorical nature of both.
He believed that the exclusion order applicable to “all persons of
Japanese ancestry” was “an obvious racial discrimination,” and he
dissented from “this legalization of racism” without questioning
whether the group subject to internment comprised a discrete
180
category.
As it decided milestone civil rights cases, the Warren Court
perpetuated the view of race as categorical and stable. Even in Loving
v. Virginia, the Court described the anti-miscegenation statute it
ultimately invalidated as “proscrib[ing] generally accepted conduct if
181
engaged in by members of different races.”
The Court
automatically accepted that racial categories are fixed classifications
in which one is either a member or a non-member—an ironic stance
given that Loving would presumably call those categories into
question by legalizing marriage between members of supposedly
different racial categories and paving the way for offspring whose
182
identities in relation to the categories would be unclear.
The entrenched notion of race as discrete and categorical survived
183
the Warren Court. In the 1984 case Palmore v. Sidoti, the Court
invalidated a custody decision based solely on the race of the parties
involved, explaining that “[c]lassifying persons according to their

176. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
177. See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631 (14th
ed. 2001).
178. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added).
179. See id. at 233, 235–38 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 234, 242.
181. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
182. Id. at 5.
183. 466 U.S. 429.
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race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public
184
concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category.”
This implicit acceptance of stable racial classifications and
corresponding tiers of scrutiny continues today. For example, the
Court recently invalidated a school redistricting scheme in Parents
185
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 without
commenting on the descriptive utility of the racial classifications at
issue.
The Court has likewise assumed the categorical nature of racial
identity when deciding cases brought pursuant to Title VII.
The burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
186
Green and refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
187
Burdine requires the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by
showing: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for
the position which she held or to which she applied; (3) rejection for
the position despite her qualifications; and (4) selection of an
188
individual outside the protected class to replace the plaintiff.
The Court has assumed that membership in a protected class is stable
and defined by conventional racial categories. Indeed, McDonnell
Douglas itself equated the first part of the prima facie case with a
requirement that the plaintiff allege membership in a “racial
minority,” implying that minority membership is both obvious and
189
self-defining.
In each instance, the Court’s decision presumed the categorical
nature of group identity. Categories are the framework from which
the rest of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence flows. Courts review
claims of discrimination in light of the existence of a category to
which the individual claiming the discrimination belongs. Whether a
plaintiff succeeds on a claim of race discrimination hinges on a
showing that she was discriminated against because she was Asian
(or Black, or White, etc.). In other words, proving discrimination
implicitly entails a link to the underlying category against which
animus is directed.
Categories are so central to our
antidiscrimination jurisprudence that we have difficulty conceiving
what a race discrimination claim would look like without a
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 432.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252–56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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description of animus directed at one of the socially acknowledged
racial categories. The claim, “I was fired because of my race,” thus
invites the question, “So what race are you?”
As a result of this dependence on categories, antidiscrimination
jurisprudence is a lonely place for individuals—such as those who are
identified as multiracial—whose identification transcends prevailing
categorical schemes. When multiracial individuals have brought
claims alleging that they were discriminated against because they were
perceived as multiracial, courts have generally skirted the issue of
their race. The next Section details that evasion and explores its
consequences within courts’ decision-making processes.
B. Judicial Treatment of Multiracial Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs explicitly identified as multiracial or biracial are a rarity
within antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Searching Westlaw for
federal cases brought within the past two decades yielded only three
Equal Protection claims and five Title VII claims brought by explicitly
190
identified mixed-race plaintiffs.
All were district court cases, and
five of the eight were unpublished. Multiracial plaintiffs, then, are
seldom identified even at the district court level and are wholly
absent from appellate and Supreme Court decisions within
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Remarkably, I was unable to locate
any state court decisions within the past twenty years brought by a
191
person identified as mixed-race. This paucity of claims brought by
plaintiffs identified as multiracial does not mean that no such

190. To identify federal cases, I conducted the following search in Westlaw’s
“ALLFEDS” database: (biracial multiracial “mixed race” “racially mixed”) & (“equal
protection” “title vii”) & da(aft 01/01/1990). This search yielded 329 cases, which I
then read to determine whether the plaintiff in the case was explicitly identified as
multiracial. The vast majority of plaintiffs were not. Three cases in which the
plaintiff was explicitly identified as multiracial involved Equal Protection claims.
Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Cannon v. Burkybile,
No. 99 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409852 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000); Godby v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Five cases involved Title
VII claims. Smith v. CA, Inc, No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 30, 2008); Watkins v. Hospitality Group Management, Inc., No. 1:02CV00897,
2003 WL 22937710 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2003); Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No.
CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757 (D. Minn. May 13, 2002); Mitchell v. Champs
Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of
Regents, Civ. A. No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994).
191. To identify state cases, I conducted the same search described supra note 190
in Westlaw’s “ALLSTATES” database. This search yielded 85 cases, but none of them
involved mixed-race plaintiffs.
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plaintiffs have brought claims—it simply means that courts have only
192
acknowledged the plaintiff’s multiracial identification in eight cases.
Recognizing that any generalizations drawn from so small a
number of cases are necessarily tentative, I suggest the following
descriptive pattern:
courts have generally lumped individuals
identified as multiracial together with other members of
conventional
categories,
reformulating
the
narrative
of
discrimination of those identified as multiracial to avoid disruption of
the prevailing racial classification scheme. Only in a few instances
have courts acknowledged discrimination against multiracial
individuals qua multiracial individuals and then only when the
circumstances evinced animus so explicitly motivated by racial
mixedness that there was no alternative. I first discuss the former
type of case, then the latter. Finally, I briefly explain why courts’
limited acknowledgment of discrimination against interracial couples
is not tantamount to acknowledgment of discrimination against
multiracial people.
1.

Categorical reformulation of multiracial identification
In most instances, courts have addressed multiracial plaintiffs’
claims by reformulating them to comport with the prevailing scheme
of racial classification. This Subsection details courts’ various
strategies for channeling multiracial plaintiffs into the existing
categorical system.
One court has explicitly denied multiracial identification as a
ground for a separate discrimination claim. In Walker v. University of
193
Colorado Board of Regents, the plaintiff filed a Title VII claim
following his unsuccessful application for Associate Vice President for
194
Human Resources.
He “identified himself as a multiracial person
of Black, Native American, Jewish and Anglo descent,” and
contended that under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the
195
protected class is limited to multiracial persons.”
The court
rejected his argument “because it would be impracticable to apply
and could be so self limiting that a particular person is the only

192. I believe that the reasons for this lack of acknowledgment are multiple and
complex. See supra Part IV.A (discussing possible explanations for the exclusion of
multiracial individuals from antidiscrimination jurisprudence).
193. Civ. A. No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994).
194. Id. at *1.
195. Id.
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196

identifiable member of the group.” Moreover, the court held that
the plaintiff’s multiracial status actually diminished his likelihood of
success: “Multiracial persons may be considered members of each of
the protected groups with which they have any significant
197
identification.” The logical extension of this statement is that if the
position to which the plaintiff in Walker applied were filled by a Black,
Native American, Jewish, or Anglo individual, courts should view that
individual as a member of the plaintiff’s protected class for Title VII
purposes. Defining the scope of the plaintiff’s protected class in this
manner would preclude the plaintiff from demonstrating that he was
disadvantaged because of his race in favor of a person similarly
situated. Walker therefore highlights a concrete problem associated
with failure to acknowledge uniquely multiracial discrimination:
it forecloses the plaintiff from demonstrating that he is not similarly
situated to individuals who are not multiracial.
While Walker thus functions as an explicit denial of uniquely
multiracial discrimination, courts more typically engage in a subtle
reframing of the discriminatory narrative. One paradigmatic case to
198
which I have already alluded is Mitchell v. Champs Sports, in which
the plaintiff testified that her mother was White and her father was
Black, but based on her appearance, “many people consider her of
199
mixed Hispanic and European descent.”
Her treatment by her
employer rapidly deteriorated after her supervisor noticed that she
was often visited at the store by her Black friends and relatives; at one
point, after a visit from a Black male friend, the supervisor
200
commented that “she only dated black men.”
In allowing the
201
plaintiff’s claim to proceed, the court simply stated that the
treatment deteriorated after her supervisor “discovered . . . that she
202
was black.”
This narrative reveals a troubling application of a
principle rather like hypodescent: although the plaintiff testified that
her mother was White and her father was Black, the court reframed
her self-description and classified her simply as Black. In so doing, it
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 27–29.
199. 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 650. The case arose on the plaintiff’s motion for appointed counsel,
which the court granted, stating: “Because Mitchell’s allegations, if proven, would
likely establish intentional discrimination and support a verdict in Mitchell’s favor,
her claim has probative merit.” Id.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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failed to acknowledge the possibility that her poor treatment was
motivated by animus against racial mixing. The employer may have
perceived the plaintiff as mixed, and therefore racially deceptive,
rather than simply as Black.
203
Similarly, Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. involved Title VII
claims brought by five plaintiffs, of whom the court stated flatly:
204
“Plaintiffs are African-American.”
For four of the plaintiffs, the
claimed incidents involved racial epithets and negative comments
205
But for one plaintiff, the alleged incidents
about Black people.
206
wove a more complex racial narrative. Some coworkers referred to
207
him as “FUBU,” invoking a Black identity. Others referred to him
208
And one coworker told
as “Sinbad,” a reference that is less clear.
him that “he was not black”—only in discussing that incident did the
court mention that the plaintiff was “biracial and admits that he has a
209
light complexion.”
But the court did not explore the complex
situation in which the plaintiff found himself—discriminated against
as Black by some, and as “not-really-Black” by others—and instead
opted to categorize the mixed-race plaintiff as “African-American”
210
like the other four plaintiffs.
The court allowed the claims of all
plaintiffs to survive summary judgment except those of the mixed-race
plaintiff, holding that the instances of discrimination he suffered
211
were not sufficiently severe to support a Title VII claim. While one
can never predict with certainty the result a court will reach, I believe
that, had the court considered the multiracial dimension to the
rejected plaintiff’s discriminatory narrative, it might have viewed the
comments as more serious. For example, the court’s analysis omits
any discussion of the comment that the light-skinned plaintiff was
“not really black.” In the aggregate, a more thorough analysis of the
multiracial dynamic may have persuaded the court that the plaintiff’s
case should survive summary judgment.
203. No. CIV. 00-95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757 (D. Minn. May 13, 2002).
204. Id. at *1.
205. Id. at *1–5.
206. See id. at *4 (discussing the distinct racial treatment one plaintiff received
because he was biracial).
207. Id. The court explained that “FUBU” is “an African-American line of
clothing, which stands for “For Us By Us.” Id.
208. Id. Sinbad is a relatively light-skinned Black stand-up comedian and actor.
See Sinbad, The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005435
(last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
209. Callicutt, 2002 WL 992757, at *4.
210. Id. at *10–11.
211. Id. at *11.
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In other instances, while the court nominally acknowledges that
the plaintiff was identified as multiracial, it fails to develop the
implications of that identification in its discussion. One such case is
212
Godby v. Montgomery County Board of Education, in which the court
considered an Equal Protection challenge to a school’s practice of
mandating that there would be one White and one Black
representative from each grade on the homecoming court each
213
year.
Each homeroom held a vote to nominate students for the
homecoming court; the ballot for the nomination was divided into
214
“White” and “Black” categories.
The plaintiff, a student at the
215
school, had one White parent and one Black parent. She “thinks of
herself as being ‘both’ races; and when she has been asked for her
race on forms, such as those at school, she has routinely checked
216
both categories.”
On the day of the homecoming court nominations, a student
suggested that the plaintiff should run as the homeroom’s Black
217
nominee.
“Matters became complicated when one of [the
plaintiff’s] classmates said that she should run as the homeroom’s
white nominee. Other students complained that it would be unfair
for [the plaintiff] to run for both slots, and a discussion about race
218
ensued among the students.” At one point, the homeroom teacher
took the plaintiff outside and told her that she could only run in one
category and that she would have to decide whether to run in the
219
Black category or the White category.
The school’s homecoming
director was eventually summoned to the classroom, and she told the
plaintiff that she had to choose one slot or the other in which to run:
In effect, the biracial child had to choose: was she white or black?
[The plaintiff] returned to the room and asked her classmates
which slot she should choose. The majority of the classmates told
her that she should run as the white nominee. [The plaintiff] ran
for the white slot and was selected as her homeroom’s [white]
220
nominee.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
Id. at 1396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1396–97.
Id. at 1397.
Id.
Id.
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But when the school-wide ballot was disseminated, the plaintiff’s
221
Although the school claimed that she had
name was not on it.
been omitted due to an unrelated procedural irregularity, the
school’s homecoming director “admitted that she used the school
computer in the guidance counselor’s office to look up [the
plaintiff’s] race” and found that “the registry on the school computer
222
listed [the plaintiff] as Black.” The homecoming director justified
her actions by explaining that “she thought that it was her ‘duty to
223
When
make sure what [the plaintiff] was telling [her] was true.’”
the plaintiff discovered that her name was not on the ballot, she
asked the homecoming director why, and the homecoming director
stated that it was because she “had looked up her school records and
224
discovered that [the plaintiff] was black.”
In the factual section of its opinion, the court acknowledged that
225
“the biracial child had to choose,” thereby implicitly suggesting
harm unique to mixed-race identification.
But despite this
acknowledgment, the court did not further explore the unique injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Rather, it struck down the school’s
classification system on more general grounds, holding simply that
the Fourteenth Amendment “bars the racial distinctions [that the
226
school adopted] in its homecoming nominations.”
It also noted
that “[i]t does not matter . . . that the categorization in this case
227
applied to everyone.”
The court’s only acknowledgment of the
particular harm to the biracial plaintiff was one oblique comment:
“The classification paints only with the broad brush of black and
white, ignoring any subtleties,” and is thus unlikely to be narrowly
228
tailored.
The court’s decision denying summary judgment to the
defendants is otherwise a general indictment of the use of racial

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1398.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1407.
227. Id. at 1408.
228. Id. at 1410. At the very end of its Equal Protection analysis, the court also
noted that the school “has engaged in a practice of racially classifying students for
purposes of extracurricular activities, and perhaps enforcing a rigid racial system
which considers all (partial) non-whites to be ‘black.’” Id. at 1411. This comment
might be read as a gesture at the possibility that the school disqualified the plaintiff
from running as the White nominee because she was mixed-race, but the phrasing is
open to interpretation.
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categories without narrow tailoring and a compelling government
229
interest.
The court’s analysis could have been phrased the same way had the
case been brought by a White, Black, or Asian student, and its
generalized invalidation is a legally correct way of deciding the case.
Yet the analysis also reflects a choice to ignore the nuances of the
factual narrative, which indicated an injury unique to a person
identified as multiracial. A person perceived as monoracial would
not have been subject to her classmates’ debate over her racial
identity. Nor would a teacher have taken a student perceived as
monoracial into the hall and instructed her that she had to choose
one of the established racial categories. Nor would the chosen racial
identification of a student perceived as monoracial have engendered
suspicion in an administrator such that the administrator felt
compelled to verify the “truth” of that self-identification. Nor would
a student perceived as monoracial have been deprived, ultimately, of
the opportunity to compete in the homecoming nomination process.
In effect, the school erased the plaintiff’s biracial identity with its
categorical homecoming nomination system; the court in turn erased
that same identity with a generalized invalidation that failed to
acknowledge the harm imposed by the school. In so doing, the court
revealed its reluctance to engage the complexities of multiracial
identification and to acknowledge the unique injuries suffered by
multiracial people by categories that do not include them.
230
Smith v. CA, Inc. provides another example of judicial denial of
multiracial animus. The plaintiff, a “biracial African American and
Caucasian[,]” brought a Title VII claim contending that he had
231
suffered an adverse employment action on account of his race.
The facts alleged convey a unique multiracial dynamic. The court
noted that the plaintiff, Walter Smith, asked his employer to classify
232
him as Caucasian and that his employer agreed to do so.
In his
deposition, Smith explained that he is biracial, stating, “I pick and
choose what I call myself, or how I identify myself, dependent on the
233
situation at hand and what’s beneficial for me at the time.’” Smith
229. See id. at 1407–11 (rejecting the school system’s position on the ground that
the system presented no remedy to any problem, let alone a narrowly tailored
remedy).
230. No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2008).
231. Id. at *5, *11.
232. Id. at *2 n.3.
233. Id.
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added that he received racially derogatory treatment from both
White and Black people, noting, “‘[S]ince I get hit from both sides,
234
Smith’s remark indicated that at least some
I play both sides.’”
people tended to identify him as racially mixed, and his request that
his employer classify him as Caucasian indicated that he himself
identified at least in some ways as White. And by making the request,
he made his mixed-race background salient to the employer,
increasing the likelihood that his coworkers perceived him as
multiracial.
Moreover, the instances of discrimination that Smith alleged are
frankly ambiguous with respect to how he was perceived. In one
235
instance, a coworker referred to him as a “bitch” and as a “boy.”
When addressed to an adult male, these terms are perhaps most
associated with anti-Black animus. Yet another coworker made a
derogatory comment about African-American fathers in Smith’s
236
presence. This comment is more open to interpretation: it might
have been motivated by animus against Black people, or it might have
been targeted at Smith because he had a Black father and a White
mother. But while the court nominally acknowledged that the
plaintiff was biracial, it tailored its analysis of his employment
discrimination claim to match a standard anti-Black narrative of
discrimination; the court did not acknowledge the multiracial
dynamic of Smith’s racial self-identification coupled with the nature
237
of the discrimination he alleged.
The court stated tersely:
There is no dispute that Smith was a member of a protected group
as a biracial African American and Caucasian. Smith has provided
evidence of only two instances in which he was arguably harassed
based on his protected characteristic. The first instance involved
the “bitch/boy” comments made by [a coworker]. The second
instance involved the comments made by [a different coworker]
238
about African American fathers.

234. Id.
235. Id. at *1 n.1.
236. See id. at *1 (describing Smith’s claim that a coworker “stated he was
surprised an African American father like Smith would fight so hard for custody of
his children”).
237. See id. at *11 (considering the frequency and severity of the racial remarks
and the defendant’s remedial action in response to comments from the plaintiff’s
coworker).
238. Id.
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The court ultimately decided the case against Smith on the ground
239
that he did not suffer an adverse employment action, and therefore
a firm resolution of whether the harassment he suffered was based on
his protected characteristic was not essential to the outcome of the
case. But the court failed even to acknowledge that, were it to
grapple with the sufficiency of Smith’s allegations of discrimination,
the question was a complicated one. By failing to engage the
possibility that the comments were motivated by the employer’s
identification of Smith as biracial rather than Black, the court
essentially ignored the record evidence that potentially supported a
reading of animus against Smith as biracial.
240
A comparison of Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc. and Watkins v. Hospitality
241
Group Management, Inc. provides telling evidence of the courts’
insistence on categorization in the antidiscrimination context.
In Moore, an African-American woman who brought a Title VII claim
after being replaced at her job described herself as dark-skinned,
“even within the range of other African Americans, and especially
compared to persons of non-African-American heritage, including
242
persons of mixed race.” She argued that she was treated worse than
243
a mixed-race person who had considerably lighter skin. The court
rejected the claim, holding that the mixed-race individual “is a
244
member of plaintiff’s protected class.” It further held:
To recognize a legal hierarchy within the protected class of race
based upon differences in the hues of skin color would create or
deny legal remedies based upon sub-categories of this class that
Congress has not chosen to recognize. It could also open the door
to nearly insurmountable issues of proof in court regarding the
actual racial heritage of a plaintiff and/or a person replacing a
plaintiff, not to mention difficulties for everyone in the daily
245
application of the Civil Rights Act.

239. Id.
240. No. 1:05-CV-107, 2006 WL 2701058 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006).
241. No. 1:02CV00897, 2003 WL 22937710 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2003).
242. Moore, 2006 WL 2701058, at *2.
243. Id. Moore seems like a strong candidate for a color claim, and, indeed, she
attempted to raise such a claim before the district court. See id. at *3 (stating that this
“appears to be a back-door attempt to . . . add claims of sex and color
discrimination”). But the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over that
claim because the plaintiff had failed to raise it before the EEOC and thus had failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under Title VII. Id. at *3–4.
244. Id. at *4.
245. Id.
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In short, the court held that a biracial person with Black ancestry
and a non-mixed-race Black person are equivalent for Title VII
purposes. This decision essentially affirms the logic of hypodescent—
if someone is even partially Black, then that person is Black and is
properly classified with other Black people.
Moore’s analysis contrasts sharply with the court’s brief statement in
Watkins. There, the court explained that the plaintiff “is a female of
mixed race who was fired and replaced by a white male,” and that
“to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she need only
demonstrate that her job performance met [her employer’s]
246
legitimate expectations when she was fired.” The court thus found
it obvious that a mixed-race person was a member of a different racial
class than a white person—so obvious, in fact, that no further analysis
was needed. That the issue of whether a mixed-race person is held to
be comparable to a monoracial person is resolved one way when the
monoracial person is White and another way when the monoracial
person is Black demonstrates the arbitrariness of the courts’ rulings
on these issues. It also demonstrates the extent to which hypodescent
continues to infect judicial reasoning, even if courts now make such
judgments implicitly rather than explicitly. Most importantly for
purposes of this Article, the two cases both reveal a judicial
unwillingness to grapple with the complexity of multiracial identity in
the context of antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
2.

Limited acknowledgment of mixed-race discrimination
In the cases in which courts have addressed plaintiffs’ multiracial
identification, they did so because the narrative of multiracial
discrimination was so explicit that they had no alternative but to
deviate from the established monoracial narrative. Only two such
examples appear in the case law.
247
One, Moore v. Board of Education, involved a claimed Equal
Protection violation brought by a student described as an “AfricanAmerican/Caucasian mixed race male” who suffered harassment
248
from a Black teacher as a result of his mixed ancestry.
Among
other allegations, the teacher referred to the plaintiff as a
“Euronigger”; told other students that the plaintiff “was like a
plantation owner telling students what to do”; told one of the
246. Watkins, 2003 WL 22937710, at *9.
247. 300 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
248. Id. at 642.
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plaintiff’s friends not to lower a blind after plaintiff had asked him to
because “it’s the Caucasian blood in him that he thinks he can tell
you what to do”; stated that he didn’t know whether the plaintiff
“was Caucasian or Negroid”; stated that the plaintiff was arrogant
because of his lighter complexion; and stated that the plaintiff was a
249
Tensions
“‘confused person’ because of his ‘mixed heritage.’”
came to a head during an incident in which the plaintiff commented
that the teacher was distracting him with “interruptions” and the
teacher responded: “That’s the Caucasian blood in him makes him
250
think he can say whatever he wants.”
After the plaintiff was
instructed to leave the classroom, the teacher first blocked his exit;
then, after the plaintiff tried to walk around him, the teacher placed
him in a “choking headlock,” breaking two wires from a prior cervical
spine surgery, which forced the plaintiff to wear a neck brace and
251
restricted his physical activity for six weeks.
The other case in which a court acknowledged animus as
252
multiracial qua multiracial, Cannon v. Burkybile, involved a prisoner
who filed an Equal Protection claim following repeated racial
253
harassment by a guard. The guard challenged the prisoner’s right
to use the law library stating: “You are either a half-breed or of a
mixed race and you shouldn’t be up here. I hate all you half-breeds
and you definitely won’t be coming back to the law library this
254
afternoon.”
The guard repeatedly blocked the inmate’s access to
the library after that incident and at one point told the inmate that
255
“he was the same half-breed he always hated.”
The court denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim,
explaining that the plaintiff had adequately pled claims of racial
discrimination by alleging that the guard “impeded his access to the
256
law library . . . on account of his mixed-race.”
Moore and Cannon share such explicit evidence of specifically
multiracial animus that it would be extraordinary, even bizarre, for a
court to frame either case as one of discrimination stemming from
animus against a monoracial group. But these isolated instances—
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 643 n.2.
Id. at 643.
Id.
No. 99 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409852 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5.
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two examples in the entire corpus of federal cases—attests to the
rarity of judicial acknowledgment of animus that is uniquely
multiracial in character. And of course, because both cases are
257
district court cases, they lack significant precedential force.
Moreover, the courts in both Moore and Cannon simply described the
discrimination that the plaintiffs suffered without any analysis of the
uniqueness of that discrimination to the plaintiffs’ perceived
multiracial identification.
3.

Discrimination against interracial couples: related but distinct
Perhaps bolstered by the animating principles of Loving, courts
have been more receptive to claims of discrimination brought by one
258
member of an interracial couple. One paradigmatic case is that of
259
Holcomb v. Iona College, in which a White basketball coach who
married a Black woman claimed that he was fired after his
supervisor called him a “nigger lover” and asked him whether he was
260
“really going to marry that Aunt Jemima.”
Writing for a panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi
held that a claim of adverse action based on an employee’s
association with a person of another race is cognizable under Title
VII and agreed that the basketball coach had raised factual issues with
261
respect to whether race was a motivating factor in his termination.
One might argue that judicial validation of such claims is
tantamount to an acknowledgment of multiracial identification and
the need to protect those identified as multiracial—after all,
protection of the unions that produce people likely to be perceived
as multiracial is closely linked to protection against discrimination of
multiracial people themselves.
But this interpretation is too
generous: the notion of an “interracial relationship” is predicated on
the two people in the relationship being of different races, and this, if
anything, reinforces the categorical foundations of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence. In existing case law, interracial relationships are
always characterized as occurring between two monoracial people—
no court has considered a claim of interracial discrimination brought
by a couple of whom one member was multiracial and one member
257. Indeed, Cannon is unpublished, and its citation is therefore prohibited in
many jurisdictions.
258. See cases cited supra note 163.
259. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
260. Id. at 134.
261. Id. at 132.
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was monoracial. Thus, judicial sympathy for those engaged in
interracial relationships does not equate to recognition of the unique
form of animus directed at multiracial people.
Moreover, some courts have resisted acknowledging our society’s
262
lingering hostility to interracial marriage. In United States v. Barber,
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the trial court did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause when it denied the request of an
interracial couple, tried jointly on criminal fraud charges, to question
263
jurors regarding attitudes about interracial marriage. The majority
held:
[E]very criminal trial cannot be conducted as though race is an
issue simply because the trial participants are of different races. If
racial prejudice is ever to be eliminated, society’s general concerns
about such prejudice must not be permitted to erode the courts’
264
efforts to provide impartial trials for the resolution of disputes.

The majority felt that “[t]he very process of exploring such factors
would heighten their role in the decision-making process,” and would
265
therefore run a greater risk of corrupting the process. The dissent
disagreed, explaining: “[N]o matter how much we dislike it, . . . we
do not live in a color blind world and . . . many individuals still
harbor negative attitudes and feelings about marriage between blacks
266
and whites. To deny that fact is to ignore a social reality.”
The
dissent thus found persuasive the defendants’ claim that they would
need to know jurors’ attitudes toward interracial marriage “when
267
attempting to secure an unbiased and fair jury.”
The majority’s
resistance to acknowledging the possibility of prejudice motivated by
an interracial relationship exemplifies some courts’ skepticism about
the extent of such prejudice and the need for remedies expressly
tailored to address animus motivated by racial mixing.
In summary, courts’ acknowledgment of animus against interracial
relationships does not meaningfully challenge the paradigmatic racial
categories. While such acknowledgment does provide a measure of
judicial recognition that society is not fully comfortable with racial
mixing, this recognition does not actually challenge the categories
that make racial mixing salient. And some courts remain skeptical
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

80 F.3d 964 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Id. at 970.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 967–68.
Id. at 973 (Murnahan, J., dissenting).
Id.
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both of the extent of antipathy toward racial mixing and of the
notion that the judiciary should intervene to combat such antipathy.
Consequently, acknowledgment of animus motivated by interracial
relationships is not a functional substitute for claims of multiracial
discrimination.
C. Academic Omission
Courts’ erasure of multiracial discrimination in the
antidiscrimination context is mirrored by scholarly literature.
As noted, in recent years multiracial individuals have been the subject
268
of extensive scholarly discussion. Yet such discussion almost always
occurs when multiracial individuals are the primary subject of the
scholarly work, and this focus is almost always linked to the diversity
269
or demographic contexts.
A search of the “Journals and Law
Reviews” database within Westlaw yields about fifty articles with the
term “multiracial,” “biracial,” “mixed race,” or “racially mixed” in the
title of the piece. While there is some overlap among topics, by my
rough estimate, one-third of the articles discuss either the
demographic or diversity contexts; one-third discuss the role of
multiracial identity in the legal system from a theoretical perspective;
and one-third use the term “multiracial” in a non-individual context
(for example, to refer to “multiracial coalitions,” meaning coalitions
that involve more than one race).
Only one student note has even mentioned discrimination against
mixed-race people in relation to antidiscrimination jurisprudence:
in the Title VII context, Ken Nakasu Davison focuses primarily on
mixed-race individuals whose employers view them as members of a
racial category other than the one with which they identify
270
themselves.
While exploring that topic, Davison also briefly
271
He explains
summarizes the notion of multiracial discrimination.
268. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (discussing the focus of scholarly
literature addressing multiracial individuals).
269. See Jean Stefancic, Multiracialism: A Bibliographic Essay and Critique in Memory of
Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1521, 1525–38 (1997) (organizing multiracial
scholarship into seven categories—(1) interracial relationships and marriage;
(2) racial identity; (3) racial formation; (4) census categories and other
classifications; (5) essentialism and intersectionality; (6) transracial adoption and
child custody; and (7) “toward the new multiracial society”—but omitting discussion
of animus against those perceived as mixed-race).
270. Davison, supra note 5, at 180–85.
271. See id. at 179–80 (arguing that racism against mixed-race individuals comes in
the form of direct discrimination, because of the individuals’ mixed-race status, as
well as discrimination based on an incorrect assumption about the individuals’ race).
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that mixed-race people “are directly discriminated against because of
their distinct mixed identity,” primarily based on quasi-scientific
arguments about multiracial individuals’ inferiority due to “hybrid
272
degeneracy” and “sociocultural rejection.”
But aside from Davison’s work, no research has examined
discrimination claims specifically alleging multiracial discrimination.
Indeed, some scholarly work ignores the potential confounding
influence of multiracial identification in the antidiscrimination
context. For example, Kenji Yoshino relates the story of Lawrence
Mungin, “an African-American attorney who brought an unsuccessful
273
race discrimination suit against his law-firm employer.”
Yoshino
provides a thorough account of Mungin’s struggle to ascend through
274
the predominantly White ranks of an elite law firm.
Ultimately,
after Mungin was denied promotion to partner, he filed a Title VII
275
suit alleging race discrimination.
Yoshino focuses on Mungin’s attempts to shield White people from
the threat of his Black identity. Although Yoshino acknowledges that
Mungin “was raised in poverty in Brooklyn and Queens by his biracial
mother,” Yoshino does not further engage the possibility that having
276
a biracial mother may have affected Mungin’s life course.
Was Mungin ever identified as biracial, like his mother? Did he ever
identify himself as biracial? How did Mungin’s biracial mother
influence his interactions with others in the community? To the
extent that Mungin identified himself or was identified by others as
biracial, how did his mixed-race identification shape his own views
about race? How did it affect his ability to perform his race in a way
that was non-threatening to White people? Perhaps the impact was
negligible, perhaps not—but the complete omission of discussion is
noteworthy.

272. Id. at 179.
273. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 879–86 (2002).
274. See id. at 882–84 (describing Mungin’s numerous efforts to assimilate through
dress, emphasis on his academic reputation, disassociation from other AfricanAmericans, and disregard of racial slights).
275. Id. at 879.
276. Id. at 880–81. Yoshino notes that Mungin’s mother “considered herself to be
black,” but does not provide further analysis of her mixed race status. Id. at 880.
Did others also consider her to be black? What about Mungin’s father? The extent
to which Mungin’s early experiences involved awareness of racial mixing and racial
fluidity may well have affected the course of his life—or they may have had no effect
at all—but Yoshino’s account does not address that possibility.
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A similar omission occurs in Randall Kennedy’s discussion of the
277
Kennedy’s description of the case acknowledges
Rhinelander case.
the wife’s racially-mixed background, noting that she “was the
278
daughter of a white mother and a black father.”
Kennedy then
describes the closing argument in Rhinelander as follows:
“The attorney for Rhinelander made an all-out plea for the jury
simply to register its disgust with inter-racial marriage. ‘There isn’t a
father among you,’ he declared, ‘who would not rather see his son in
279
Yet this
his casket than to see him wedded to a mulatto woman.’”
analysis of the multiracial dynamic in Rhinelander is incomplete.
Had Kennedy quoted more of the closing argument, it would have
become clear that the attorney’s speech actually revealed not only
antipathy toward interracial marriage, but also a unique contempt for
those perceived as racially mixed. The sentence immediately
following the portion Kennedy chose to quote in his article reads:
280
“Decent blacks have the same feeling.”
In other words, at least
according to the attorney, Blacks as well as Whites would rather see
their children dead than married to a “mulatto.” This statement
draws a distinction between “mulattos” and “decent blacks,” and
suggests that perhaps at least some Whites and Blacks were unified in
preferring not to marry those seen as racially mixed. Yet Kennedy
elides that interpretation, describing the attorney as playing to the
jury’s disgust with “inter-racial marriage” rather than disgust at
marrying a woman perceived as racially mixed and hence intrinsically
impure.
The omissions I have detailed are only two of many such scholarly
elisions, and I have chosen them as examples simply because the
work in which they appear is otherwise meticulous and provocative.
But many other scholarly works also gloss over multiracial identity in
the context of discrimination, preferring to cast their claims in terms
of conventional discrete racial categories without even bracketing
the possibility of non-categorical identification. This scholarly
omission both reflects and reinforces the reluctance of the courts
to acknowledge multiracial individuals in the antidiscrimination
context.
277. See generally Kennedy, supra note 77, at 1155–56 (considering the annulment of
a marriage between a mixed-raced woman and a White man). Rhinelander is also
discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 47–49.
278. Id. at 1155.
279. Id. at 1156.
280. Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie, supra note 49, at 2436 (citations omitted).
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281

IV. “INVISIBLE PEOPLE” : THE ERASURE OF MULTIRACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
In considering claims of racial discrimination, courts typically slot
plaintiffs into one of the five categories of Hollinger’s ethno-racial
282
pentagon. Yet animus is not always so easily classified. Society does
not always perceive an individual’s racial identity as falling into a neat
category, and consequently racial animus is not always captured by
283
one of the conventional categories.
Some may object that, as an empirical matter, multiracial
identification is so rare as not to merit substantial discussion. A small
percentage of people may be identified as multiracial—these skeptics
may argue—but the vast majority of people are slotted into one
category or another based on their physical appearance, and, to the
extent that they experience discrimination, it is on the basis of their
perceived membership in that category. “Sure, Tiger Woods has
White, Black, Asian, and Native American ancestors,” these skeptics
may say, “but when society sees him on the street, they see a Black
284
man.”
In response, I first reiterate the point I raised in Part I—that many
other cues aside from physical appearance may trigger identification
of an individual as racially mixed. Perhaps people would label Tiger
Woods as Black if they saw him on the street, perhaps not. But if they
heard him describe himself as “Cablinasian,” as he has to reporters,
281. See, e.g., Ramona E. Douglass, Letter to the Editor, Multiracial People Must No
Longer Be Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at A26 (arguing that multiracial people
are “invisible statistically to the medical research community”).
282. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Part III.
284. Public discourse surrounding Woods’s recent disclosures of marital infidelity
reflects preoccupation with both his racial identity and with interracial relationships.
The fact that Woods’s wife and his alleged mistresses are White adds an additional
dimension to the scandal that, for many, affects their perception of Woods’s
behavior. Some self-identified members of the Black community describe themselves
as less sympathetic to his situation given that he has refused to identify himself as
Black and that he married a White woman; others express the sentiment that even
given Woods’s disavowal that he is Black, they would prefer to see him with a Black
woman. See, e.g., Tiger Woods Alienates Black Community with White Lovers, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/12/06/20091206_tiger_woods_alienates_black_community_with_white_lovers.html (discussing
the relationship of Woods’s multiracial identity to public perception of the scandal
and, remarkably, generating over six hundred comments from readers); Lisa Fritsch,
Tiger Woods and the Problem of the “Great Black Example,” AFROSPEAR, Dec. 28, 2009,
http://afrospear.com/2009/12/28/tiger-woods-and-the-problem-of-the-great-blackexample%E2%80%8F-by-lisa-fritsch (discussing hostility generated toward Woods’s
racial choices in romantic partners within the “black community”).
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285

their perceptions might change. I also invite skeptics to peruse one
of the many books featuring photographs and biographies of people
286
My intuition is that most people will
identified as racially mixed.
have considerable difficulty visually classifying many of the featured
individuals using conventional racial categories, and this difficulty
may help persuade skeptics that many individuals are, indeed,
identified as multiracial. Finally, I emphasize that the inhospitality of
antidiscrimination jurisprudence to multiracial people is particularly
problematic from a forward-looking perspective.
As rates of
287
interracial marriage continue to increase,
the number of
individuals who are perceived as and discriminated against as
multiracial will likely continue to increase as well.
Proceeding from the conclusion that individuals identified as
multiracial are a non-negligible segment of the population, and that
such individuals do indeed experience a unique form of animus as
demonstrated in Part II, this Part examines the reasons underlying
the absence of multiracial people from antidiscrimination
jurisprudence. It then explores the consequences of that absence
both for individuals who are identified as multiracial and for society.
A. Causes of Unacknowledged Multiracial Discrimination
Multiracial individuals are largely absent from antidiscrimination
jurisprudence for a variety of interwoven reasons. This Section rules
out several potential causes and then posits a more plausible
explanation for the absence.
As the many examples in Part II demonstrate, animus against
multiracial people is real and powerful. For some, the notion of
racial mixing incites a visceral contempt. It is not the case, therefore,
that antidiscrimination claims brought by multiracial people are
uncommon because animus against multiracial people simply does
not exist.
Nor are there obvious constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
barriers to such suits. Rather, the reverse is true. The Equal
285. See Kamiya, supra note 124 (noting that Tiger Woods admitted on Oprah that
it bothered him when he was called an “African-American”).
286. See, e.g., FULBECK, supra note 23 (introducing “Hapas,” mixed-race individuals
of Asian or Pacific Island decent, through a book that offers pictures and words from
the Hapa population).
287. See EDMONSTON, supra note 99, at 246 (hypothesizing that the increase in the
population of mixed-race individuals, from 22 million to 189.1 million in the next
century, translates also into an increase of interracial marriages).
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Protection Clause straightforwardly guarantees to all people
288
while Title VII forbids
“the equal protection of the laws,”
289
And the Equal
discrimination “because of [an] individual’s race.”
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) website specifically
explains that “Title VII’s prohibitions apply regardless of whether the
discrimination is directed at Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos, Arabs,
Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, multi-racial
290
individuals, or persons of any other race, color, or ethnicity.”
The EEOC’s Compliance Manual does not specifically address
291
multiracial individuals.
It does note, however, that “Title VII does
not contain a definition of ‘race,’ nor has the Commission adopted
292
one.” Coupled with the explicit mention of multiracial individuals
on the EEOC’s website, the most logical reading is that the EEOC
views discrimination against multiracial individuals as illegal and that
it views claims of such discrimination as administratively and judicially
cognizable.
Having ruled out lack of multiracial animus and explicit
governmental prohibition as explanations for the lack of
antidiscrimination suits filed by multiracial people, we must seek
other explanations for the invisibility of multiracial discrimination
claims in antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Perhaps the absence of
multiracial individuals from the antidiscrimination context is in part
293
the result of monoracial self-identification by people of mixed race.
Many people who might be viewed by some as mixed-race identify
294
more strongly, or even exclusively, with one race or another. When
such individuals suffer discrimination, they may choose to bring

288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
290. U.S.
Equal
Opportunity
Employment
Commission,
Race/Color
Discrimination, http://archive.eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010)
(emphasis added).
291. See EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 15: Race and Color Discrimination
(2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf.
292. Id. at 15-3.
293. See David L. Brunsma & Kerry Ann Rockquemore, What Does “Black” Mean?
Exploring the Epistemological Stranglehold of Racial Categorization, 28 CRITICAL SOC. 101,
110 (2002).
294. See, e.g., Melissa Herman, Forced to Choose: Some Determinants of Racial
Identification in Multiracial Adolescents, 75 CHILD DEV. 730, 736 tbl.2 (2004) (surveying
multiracial youth, ages fourteen to nineteen, and finding that, when forced to
choose one race, sixty-eight percent of Black/White students, fifty-two percent of
Hispanic/White students, and forty-three percent of Asian/White students chose the
minority race instead of “White”).
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lawsuits in which they describe themselves as monoracial rather than
multiracial.
Although this approach might be taken in many cases, evidence
does not support the conclusion that monoracial self-classification
occurs in every case or even in most cases. Research indicates that
many people who might be identified by others as multiracial also
perceive themselves that way. For example, David Brunsma and
Kerry Ann Rockquemore found that when participants in a study who
identified themselves as having one Black parent and one White
parent were given an array of identity options, only 16.7% adopted a
“singular identity,” considering themselves either exclusively Black
295
(13.1%) or exclusively White (3.6%).
The proposition that
multiracial people unilaterally decide to identify themselves as
monoracial in their claims of discrimination is therefore an
incomplete explanation.
Alternatively, even people who identify themselves as multiracial
may be viewed by outsiders—employers, coworkers, classmates, and
so on—as monoracial based on the same factors discussed in Part I.
For example, an individual with one Black parent and one White
parent may be labeled by others as Black based on her appearance, or
an individual with one White parent and one Latina/o parent may be
labeled by others as Latina after she is overheard speaking Spanish
with a friend. This public perception of an individual as monoracial
may provoke the discriminatory behavior that culminates in an Equal
Protection or Title VII claim. In such a situation, it may make logical
narrative sense for the plaintiff to describe herself as monoracial in
her lawsuit, regardless of how she views herself.
When the
discriminatory behavior is motivated by animus against a single race,
identification of a plaintiff as racially mixed may not add to the
narrative for purposes of an Equal Protection or Title VII claim and
may even provide an unwanted distraction. This explanation,
however, while plausible in some instances, also seems incomplete
given the evidence of animus uniquely directed at those perceived as
racially mixed. Perhaps multiracial people may sometimes be
identified as monoracial and consequently decide to identify
themselves as such in their lawsuits, but many examples indicate that
296
they are not always so identified.

295. Brunsma & Rockquemore, supra note 293, at 110.
296. See cases discussed supra notes 146–172 and accompanying text.
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Advice from legal counsel motivated by tactical considerations may
also lead to the invisibility of multiracial people in antidiscrimination
jurisprudence. The likelihood of success on an Equal Protection or
Title VII challenge no doubt increases when a plaintiff can conform
his or her claim to an established narrative; and as I have discussed,
our category-dependent antidiscrimination jurisprudence consists
primarily of narratives that embrace categories and, hence,
297
monoracial identification.
But the influence of legal counsel in fact indicates another
explanation.
Given that lawyers are primarily guided by the
precedents created in judicial opinions, courts bear significant
responsibility for the invisibility of multiracial plaintiffs. In most cases
involving a plaintiff described as multiracial, the court failed to
acknowledge explicitly that the plaintiff was perfectly entitled to
bring a case as a multiracial plaintiff and that at least part of the harm
alleged may have been unique to the perception of the plaintiff as a
multiracial individual. The employee in Mitchell may have received
worse treatment from her employer, not because the employer
298
realized that she “was black” as the court said, but because her
employer came to view her as racially mixed. The problem with the
categorical scheme in Godby was not only that it established separate
divisions for White and Black homecoming nominees, but also that it
created a unique dilemma for multiracial individuals:
either
unwillingly choose one of two prescribed racial labels or else face
299
exclusion from both racial categories.
The discrimination alleged
in Smith may well have been directed at Smith as a multiracial person
rather than as a Black person—a logical outgrowth of Smith’s own
statement that he gets discrimination from “both sides,” so he plays it
300
both ways.
And courts’ failure—as in Moore and Watkins—to
acknowledge that people identified as racially mixed may not be
similarly situated to those identified as monoracial further obscures

297. See supra Part III.B.
298. Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (1998).
299. See supra notes 212–229 and accompanying text.
300. Smith v. CA, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2008). Of course, the court’s failure to engage this dynamic may result
in part from Smith’s attorney’s failure to engage this dynamic in the briefs or enter it
in the factual record. But such an absence does not need to be ignored; rather, it
can be bracketed and highlighted as a genuine void in the record.
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the distinct character of multiracial animus in the antidiscrimination
301
context.
In short, courts generally fail to recognize a multiracial dynamic
even in cases where the opinion itself notes that the plaintiff
identifies himself as multiracial. This evasion strongly suggests that in
other instances courts simply neglect to mention that the plaintiff
identified himself as racially mixed in his pleadings. Given the
reliance of antidiscrimination jurisprudence on racial categories, it is
easiest for courts to assume that a plaintiff who works in a
predominantly White work environment and describes himself as a
biracial Black/White person in his pleadings was actually
discriminated against because his employer harbored animus toward
Black people. The same is true of other perceived racial mixtures.
While this monoracial judicial narrative likely reflects reality in some
circumstances, the many incidents reflecting animus targeted at
302
racially mixed people indicates that it is an incomplete explanation.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that courts are ignoring or
eliding at least some cases that reflect a multiracial narrative of
discrimination in order to harmonize those cases with traditional
categorical doctrine. The next Section discusses the consequences of
this elision.
B. Consequences of Unacknowledged Multiracial Discrimination
By ignoring multiracial discrimination in adherence to a categorydependent antidiscrimination jurisprudence, courts create precedent
encouraging future courts to ignore record evidence of
discrimination directed specifically at multiracial people. This failure
obscures the fact that—just as there are certain modes of
discrimination targeted at Latinos, Native Americans, and so forth—
there are certain modes of discrimination triggered specifically and
uniquely by animus toward multiracial people.
Courts’ failure to acknowledge this real animus leads to its
trivialization or even its denial. Denial, in turn, engenders an array of
harms: it warps the narratives of individual plaintiffs. It skews the
development of the law, discouraging future claims of multiracial
discrimination. And it further entrenches the crude racial categories

301. See cases discussed supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Part II.
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in our social consciousness, along with the stereotypes associated with
those categories.
1.

Damage to individual narratives of discrimination
303
Catherine MacKinnon famously
Narrative is a source of power.
304
describes it as feminism’s “methodological secret,” and other
historically disadvantaged groups have likewise adopted narrative as a
305
means to convey the injuries they have suffered.
Among various
forms of communication, narrative is uniquely capable of capturing
human experience and inspiring empathy. As Steven Winter
explains:
The attraction of narrative is that it corresponds more closely to the
manner in which the human mind makes sense of experience than
does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law. . . . In narrative,
we take experience and configure it in a conventional and
comprehensible form.
This is what gives narrative its
communicative power; it is what makes narrative a powerful tool of
persuasion and, therefore, a potential transformative device for the
306
disempowered.

Deploying narrative, then, is a valuable technique by which an
individual may convey what has happened to him. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of narrative, attesting to
the persuasive force of “tell[ing] a colorful story with descriptive
307
richness” rather than merely presenting sterile facts.

303. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 627 (explaining that, in the
context of the Mashpee Indian case, “as with most narratives, its very telling is an
expression of power”).
304. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND
LAW 5 (1987).
305. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (discussing thoughts on racial justice issues for AfricanAmericans); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We
Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (critiquing Bell’s use of “imaginative tales” and
a fictitious alter ego); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1359
n.3 (1992) (describing itself and other narrative scholarship as “example[s] of the
‘legal storytelling’ genre employed by a number of Critical Race theorists and
feminists to analyze legal thought and culture”); Symposium, Legal Storytelling,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (1989) (collecting articles by Milner S. Ball, Derrick Bell,
Mari J. Matsuda, and others on the use of stories and narratives to promote critical
examination of dominant legal paradigms).
306. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
307. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
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Consequently, judicial adaptation of a party’s narrative affects the
dynamic of power surrounding a particular controversy. A court’s act
of recounting the facts of a case inherently introduces some degree
of discrepancy from each party’s original version of the facts, as well
as some discrepancy from the events that actually transpired. Even
the most scrupulous judicial summary will inevitably present a gloss of
some sort on a party’s narrative by emphasizing certain facts or
308
eliding others. Depending on the circumstances, then, the court’s
treatment may serve either to dignify or to devalue that party’s
concerns. This narrative effect occurs regardless of the actual
outcome of the case: a court might dignify a party’s concerns and
empathize with her situation, for example, while ultimately ruling
against that party as a matter of law.
The judicial decisions surrounding the life of Fred Korematsu
illustrate the role that courts play in conferring dignity and
309
distributing power through narrative.
Dean Hashimoto
persuasively argues that the Supreme Court’s failure to include
Korematsu’s narrative of events in its decision deprived him of the
310
dignity that having his story told would have conferred. By offering
a generalized analysis of the authority of the United States
government to intern Japanese citizens during wartime rather than
acknowledging Korematsu’s personal life history, the Court
disempowered Korematsu by rendering his individual experience
311
Likewise, forty years later when Korematsu’s case was
irrelevant.
reexamined before district court judge Marilyn Patel, the issue of
whether the judge would publish her decision in writing provoked
more controversy than the substantive question of whether she would
exonerate Korematsu. While the government did not oppose
Korematsu’s exoneration, it argued that a written decision was
unnecessary; in contrast, “the Japanese American community felt
strongly about . . . articulating the exact wrongs committed by the

308. And this gloss is in addition to whatever gloss the parties’ lawyers may already
have imposed.
309. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the
exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry, including Fred Korematsu, from the
West Coast war area without suspicion of wrongdoing was within Congress’s
warmaking power because it was impossible to determine which persons were aiding
the Japanese).
310. Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States:
A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 114, 117 (1996).
311. Id. at 113, 115–17.
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312

internment.” This controversy would not have occurred but for the
fact that the act of written judicial acknowledgment confers power
313
Patel’s choice to publish a
upon those whose stories are told.
written decision ultimately reshaped the narrative around both
314
Korematsu’s experience and the Japanese internment as a whole.
In assessing the courts’ ability to confer or withhold power through
narrative, I emphasize their tendency to reframe plaintiffs’ individual
narratives into universal archetypes. As the result of this reframing,
“[t]he recrafted stories replace the realities of the litigants’ view of
the ‘facts’ with an assimilated reality more congenial to the dominant
315
culture.”
Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun have explored the
“universalizing” function of narrative in discussing the well-known
316
Mashpee Indian case.
The Mashpee claimed that their land had
been transferred to a nearby town without statutorily required
317
A threshold issue in the
approval from the federal government.
case was whether the Mashpee were a “tribe” for purposes of the
318
relevant statutory provisions. Torres and Milun explained how the
court relied on a definition of “tribe” already embedded in American
legal culture, disregarding the Mashpee’s understanding of their own
319
identity.
Thus, “requir[ing] a particular way of telling a story not
only strips away nuances of meaning but also elevates a particular
320
version of events to a non-contingent status.”
For example:
“By imposing specific ‘ethno-legal’ categories such as ‘Tribe’ on the
Mashpee, law universalizes their story. This universalizing process
eliminates differences the dominant culture perceives as
321
destabilizing.”
In sum, regardless of whether the court’s
construction of the word “tribe” was fair or proper, the imposition of
such a construction aptly demonstrates the influence that existing
cultural norms exert over judicial narrative framing.

312. Id. at 73.
313. Id. at 73–74.
314. Id.
315. Larry Catá Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment:
Judicial
Transmogrification of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain,
6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 611, 618 (1998).
316. Torres & Milun, supra note 303, at 630.
317. Id. at 633.
318. Id. at 633–36. A jury ultimately found that the Mashpee were not a tribe, and
that finding was upheld on appeal. Id. at 635–36.
319. Id. at 654.
320. Id. at 629.
321. Id. at 630.
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Claims of discrimination brought by people identified as
multiracial and discriminated against on that basis are likewise
subject to the influence of dominant social and cultural norms.
The jurisprudential reliance on discrete monoracial categories may
influence courts to reframe the narratives of multiracial plaintiffs,
recasting them as narratives of monoracial discrimination.
This judicial reconstruction subsumes the narratives of multiracial
plaintiffs within the dominant legal paradigm, ultimately distorting
those plaintiffs’ narratives of what they have experienced. In the
context of multiracial discrimination, acknowledging the multiracial
dynamic in a particular narrative is critical to an account of the harm
experienced. When courts reframe a narrative of discrimination
motivated by multiracial identification as one of discrimination
motivated by monoracial identification, they warp or render invisible
the specific narrative of discrimination that the individual perceived
as mixed-race has suffered.
Skeptics may question whether harm ensues from a court
characterizing a particular narrative of discrimination as something
other than what the plaintiff has alleged, particularly if this
recharacterization does not affect the outcome of the case. I believe,
however, that this narrative infidelity is, in fact, independently
harmful.
Consider the following stylized scenario. A plaintiff claims that he
was discriminated against because he was Asian. He alleges that his
coworkers called him a “chink,” asked him whether he ate dogs, and
mocked the shape of his eyes. He was ultimately fired for what he
believes were pretextual reasons masking racial animus. The first
sentence of the court’s opinion is as follows: “Plaintiff alleges that he
was discriminated against because he is Hispanic.” Undoubtedly, this
plaintiff would feel that the court had disregarded his narrative.
Not only did the court characterize him in a way that he had not
characterized himself, but the way in which the court characterized
him divests the other facts of their narrative impact because they are
not associated with the category of “Hispanic” as they are with the
category of “Asian.” My example is intentionally exaggerated, and
the Reader’s reaction is likely that the court’s characterization was
simply wrong. But that is exactly the point: just as an Asian plaintiff
may believe it to be wrong for a court to characterize him as
Hispanic, a multiracial plaintiff may feel it was wrong for a court to
characterize him as monoracial.
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Thus, reframing a multiracial plaintiff’s injury as one of monoracial
discrimination inherently devalues the plaintiff’s original account of
the wrong that she suffered. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of
the case, this reframing undermines the plaintiff’s dignity by
depriving her of the opportunity to vindicate her rights based on her
version of her injury. It sends the plaintiff the message that her
nuanced version of events is of no moment and that her success or
failure depends on her ability to rework her discriminatory narrative
to square with the paradigmatic narrative account involving
categories. This forced revision of the plaintiff’s story silences her
voice and displaces her from a narrative to which her experience
should be central.
Moreover, suppression of a narrative describing the harm to an
individual plaintiff—even if the narrative merely recasts one harm as
another—may produce a ripple effect of tangible negative
consequences for that plaintiff. The denial of harm leads to
alienation and isolation on the part of the plaintiff, rendering the
plaintiff vulnerable to repetition of the harm in question. The denial
of a plaintiff’s narrative may lead to disenfranchisement from the
legal system, thereby reducing the likelihood that the plaintiff will
rely on the legal system to rectify future harms. As Richard Delgado
explains:
If the only narrative law recognizes is a bad one—one that requires
that you demean yourself or tell your story in a strange or
contorted way, or jump through very high hoops even to be heard
322
at all—you will not choose to tell your story there very often.

By devaluing the individual multiracial plaintiff’s narrative and
recasting it as a familiar monoracial one, courts divest the plaintiff of
the power associated with narrative integrity; likewise, they deprive
the plaintiff of the dignity inherent in the opportunity to vindicate
his narrative in court. Moreover, the court distances the individual
from the legal system, decreasing the likelihood that he will place his
trust in the legal system to address his grievances in the future.
By rechanneling a narrative of multiracial discrimination into a
monoracial framework, courts thus inflict an additional injury upon
an individual already wounded by an original instance of
discrimination.

322. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle:
84 CAL. L. REV. 61, 92–93 (1996).

Empathy and False Empathy,
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2.

Inhospitality to claims of multiracial discrimination
Reframing narratives of mixed-race discrimination also has
consequences beyond the case in which the reframing occurs. Such
reframing skews the law in favor of certain narratives of
discrimination at the expense of others, creating precedent that
makes legal recovery easier for plaintiffs who employ a favored
narrative. Torres and Milun explain that narratives of racial
discrimination “enter legal discourse in an illustrative, even
323
exemplary, fashion.” By fitting stories of multiracial discrimination
into a jurisprudence based on categories, courts reinforce monoracial
narratives and decrease the likelihood of recovery based on
multiracial discrimination.
In some instances, the imposition of categorical norms upon
situations of multiracial discrimination may have concrete
consequences for plaintiffs’ ability to recover. As this Article has
noted, in Walker, the court held that for purposes of Title VII,
a plaintiff may be considered to be a member of all the racial groups
with which she identifies, thus limiting her ability to demonstrate that
324
she was treated worse than non-members of those groups.
Courts
have not widely adopted the approach advocated in Walker, but they
also have yet to confront the issue that Walker presents in any
systematic fashion. Given the ever-increasing rate of interracial
marriage, it seems likely that the number of plaintiffs asserting
identification with two, three, or even four conventional racial
categories will increase as well. If courts do eventually adopt Walker’s
approach to defining a plaintiff’s racial comparables for purposes of
Title VII, plaintiffs who choose to identify with multiple races will
have considerable difficulty demonstrating that they were treated
worse than those outside their racial “classification.”
The problem Walker presents is concrete. But on a more general
level, the failure to acknowledge multiracial discrimination means
that individuals who suffer discrimination because they are identified
as multiracial may choose to reframe their circumstances to fit a more
conventional narrative of monoracial discrimination. This process
further eclipses the existence of uniquely multiracial forms of
discrimination.

323. Torres & Milun, supra note 303, at 628.
324. Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 193–197.
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Several scholars have explored the impact of legal regimes on the
interrelated issues of which narratives receive recognition and how
plaintiffs frame their narratives. I discuss four examples here and
then draw broader themes from their aggregation.
The form that doctrine takes has the power to channel claims into
specific narratives at the expense of others. In the context of Title
VII jurisprudence, Vicki Schultz argues that law privileges certain
narratives, explaining that its focus on sexual harassment has diverted
325
attention away from the broader problems of gender inequality.
She explains that the emphasis on sexuality “displac[es] attention
away from genuine problems of sex discrimination” and “encourages
employees to articulate broader workplace harms as forms of sexual
326
harassment, obscuring more structural problems.”
For example,
female employees may complain about sexual jokes and pornography
in the workplace when their real concern is that they suffer from low
327
status and a lack of respect. Moreover, the myopic focus on sexual
harassment marginalizes the experiences of women who encounter
328
Schultz observes that
non-sexualized gender discrimination.
“sexual harassment law has taken on a life of its own, uprooted from
the larger project of achieving gender equality that animates Title
329
VII.”
Her insight may be analogized to the race discrimination
context: Title VII was not intended to protect specific racial categories,
but rather to eliminate racial discrimination; yet the emphasis on
categories has resulted in the exclusion of non-categorical narratives
from race discrimination jurisprudence.
Such channeling also occurs in the context of discrimination based
on racial and ethnic performance. Camille Rich explains that
according legal recognition to certain kinds of discrimination while
withholding such recognition from others affects the way that
330
plaintiffs present their claims. Rich contends that Title VII should

325. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003).
326. Id. at 2067.
327. Id.
328. See id. at 2076–77 (discussing a judge’s analysis of a sexual harassment case
that did not focus on the harassment’s sexual content, “but instead rightly stressed
that the conduct was designed to denigrate [the plaintiff] as a woman”).
329. Id. at 2119; see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1686–87 (1998) (highlighting that, although it appears that sexual
motivations lie at the core of sexual harassment, “much of the gender-based hostility
and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the
desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content”).
330. Rich, supra note 20, at 1145–46.
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protect behavior associated with race and ethnicity, emphasizing that
identity may be claimed only through “‘performative’ acts” and
positing that such identity performance is critical to an individual’s
331
dignity and sense of self. She suggests that when particular forms of
performance-based discrimination are not recognized by the courts,
plaintiffs will seek to recharacterize their claims under a more
hospitable regime. For example, in McGlothin v. Jackson Municipal
332
Separate School District, a teacher brought a claim of religious
discrimination under Title VII on the ground that the school district
where she worked fired her for wearing African head wraps and
dreadlocked hairstyles, as her Rastafarian and Hebrew-Israelite beliefs
333
required. While documentary evidence established that the teacher
had communicated that she wore the hairstyles in relation to her
“practice and heritage,” the school successfully argued that she had
334
never communicated the religious basis for her self-presentation.
Rich explains that the outcome of the case resulted from the hostility
335
of courts to claims based on “racial performance.” Because a race
discrimination claim was not available under these circumstances,
the teacher “sought to recharacterize her claims as religious
336
discrimination.”
Identity categories likewise channel claims. Kenneth Karst explains
that identity categories—for example, race or sexual orientation—are
337
simply myths that society writes.
Judicial opinions exert a form of
control over this social mythology because they “teach[] that the
identity category exists, and that membership in the category implies
a pattern of behavior within the story lines conventionally associated
338
with the category.” Consequently, “[l]aw maintains a vocabulary of
identities and sometimes even channels claims (and thus claimants)
into recognized identity categories with conventional scripts for
339
behavior.”
By choosing how to frame and address plaintiffs’
331. Id. at 1176–79.
332. 829 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
333. Id. at 854.
334. Id. at 855, 858–60.
335. Rich, supra note 20, at 1208 (finding that the court dismissed the plaintiff’s
claim because she “never represented these activities as religious but rather as
associated with race”).
336. Id.
337. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 283 (1995) (“We ‘make up people,’
inventing categories . . . .”).
338. Id. at 293.
339. Id. at 295.
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allegations of racial discrimination, courts dictate the
acknowledgment of certain identities and the narratives of
discrimination associated with them. By reframing or omitting
certain narratives, courts perpetuate the erasure of other identities
and narratives.
Finally, specifically with respect to racial categories, Juan Perea has
argued that the pervasiveness of the Black/White paradigm in legal
scholarship and jurisprudence has led to the suppression of other
340
narratives of discrimination.
Because that paradigm implicitly
requires other groups to analogize their experience to that of the
relationship between Blacks and Whites, “reliance on the binary
paradigm leads to the exclusion and marginalization of other
341
racialized people who also suffer from racism.”
This
marginalization has tangible consequences, particularly where the
analogy is imperfect. For example, a non-Black racial minority may
suffer from forms of discrimination that are not directly comparable
to anything within the Black/White binary paradigm. Perea suggests
that courts may have been indifferent to claims of discrimination
based on accent and language in part because the Black/White
binary remains central to scholarship and jurisprudence, and accent
and language are not traditional components of that binary narrative
342
of discrimination.
In other words, the prevailing legal paradigm

340. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of
American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1213, 1215 (1997) (focusing on the
exclusion of Latinos from “full membership and participation in racial discourse”).
341. Id. at 1221; see also Stephen Reinhardt, Guess Who’s Not Coming to Dinner!!,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1993) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, FACTS AT THE BOTTOM
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992)) (criticizing Bell’s binary
OF THE WELL:
Black/White racial narrative as failing to reflect the complexities of race in America).
342. Perea, supra note 340, at 1238–39. I suspect that some Readers will question
Perea’s assertion that accent and language fall wholly outside the narrative of
discrimination associated with the Black/White binary paradigm. However, in many
parts of the country, people associate a certain dialect with Black speakers, and many
Black immigrants have non-American accents and speak languages other than
English. See, e.g., Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect
Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 645 (1998) (finding that
“recruiters are less likely to offer a job to a Black English speaker” and that “black
speech patterns were an immediate marker of an undesirable job candidate”); Rich,
supra note 20, at 1162 (noting that when a “caller has triggered a cultural code
associated with a low-status race or ethnic group . . . [he], as a consequence,
is denied a[] [job] opportunity”). Although I disagree with Perea that accent and
language are irrelevant to the Black/White paradigm, I do believe that these
attributes are less central to the narrative of Black/White discrimination than they
are to narratives involving non-Black minorities. So to the extent that the
Black/White paradigm represents the dominant model for thinking about race,
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shaped the development—or rather, lack of development—of
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
I do not take a position on the substantive merits of the broader
arguments that each of these four scholars advances in their
respective works. But relevant to this Article, each has presented
compelling evidence that whether a court chooses to recognize a
certain narrative influences how future plaintiffs will present their
343
claims.
Karst and Perea emphasize that such influence extends
specifically to the categories that plaintiffs use to describe their
claims. And if a narrative is recognized, the way that the court frames
that recognition in its opinion likewise influences the fate of future
plaintiffs. First, the precedent created by judicial opinions shapes
how plaintiffs will choose to characterize their narratives of
discrimination. And second, the presence or absence of such
precedent influences the likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed in the
event that they do frame their narratives in a particular way.
The lack of precedent relating to discrimination against people
identified as multiracial creates a powerful incentive for plaintiffs to
present the discrimination they have suffered as a monoracial
narrative. Indeed, attorneys are likely to advise them to do so. In our
common law system, after all, the attorney’s goal is to analogize her
client’s case as closely as possible to previous cases. When little
precedent exists for claims of discrimination against those viewed as
multiracial, an attorney is likely to analogize her client’s case to those
involving monoracial discrimination. While nothing prevents the
attorney from analogizing a claim of mixed-race discrimination to
one of monoracial discrimination—just as nothing automatically
prevents an analogy between a case involving a Latina plaintiff and
one involving an Asian plaintiff—the attorney may decide that
introducing a multiracial dimension to the claim will provide
unnecessary distraction.
For example, in a Title VII claim,
mentioning that a particular plaintiff is part Asian and part White
may raise questions in the judge’s mind about whether the plaintiff is
in fact in a different racial category from her comparables, regardless
whether the proffered comparables are Asian or White. It may
inspire the defendant to argue that it never viewed the plaintiff as a
Perea is correct that the courts’ inhospitality to accent and language claims reflects
the fact that such claims receive lower priority within the Black/White paradigm.
343. I do not take a position on the substantive merits of the broader arguments
that each of these four scholars advances in their respective works.
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member of the minority group, or cause the judge to wonder about
the same issue. Or it may simply present the judge with an unfamiliar
scenario, one that does not necessarily resonate as one of
discrimination or generate empathy for the plaintiff.
The incentive to cast a claim as monoracial becomes even stronger
when the plaintiff has suffered discrimination that is not clearly
monoracial or multiracial in character, or that has elements of both.
Consider, for example, a case such as Smith, where the plaintiff
alleged that his coworkers referred to him as “bitch” and “boy” and
344
made repeated comments about African-American fathers.
This
narrative of discrimination is frankly ambiguous, particularly in light
of Smith’s explicit request that his company’s human resources
department reclassify him as Caucasian rather than African345
American, making his mixed-race identity salient to his coworkers.
But in such cases, it is far easier to couch the narrative as one of
discrimination straightforwardly involving animus against AfricanAmerican individuals. Previous cases provide a well-trodden narrative
path that makes the briefing more straightforward; by describing the
plaintiff as Black, the attorney need not worry about addressing
multiracial discrimination that deviates, even slightly, from this welltrodden path.
And even if a plaintiff decides to couch his claim as a narrative of
discrimination based on others’ perception of him as multiracial, the
lack of precedent would reduce his likelihood of success. A court
familiar with a monoracial narrative from innumerable prior Title VII
cases is predisposed to be amenable to a similar claim. As Richard
Ford observes, “[j]udges are likely to want the culture to be fixed and
346
knowable,” and multiracial discrimination introduces an element of
uncertainty and fluidity that judges have substantial incentives to
reject. The court’s dismissive response to the plaintiff’s claims in
Walker illustrates the unlikelihood of success as a multiracial plaintiff:
there, the court declined even to discuss how a mixed-race plaintiff

344. Smith v. CA, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-78-T-30TBM, 2008 WL 5427776, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2008).
345. As noted, “bitch” and “boy,” when addressed to adult men, are terms perhaps
most associated with animus against Black individuals. But the comment about
African-American fathers may be either the expression of further animus against
Black individuals, or it might be the expression of animus against racial mixing and
against Smith for being racially mixed. See supra notes 230–237 and accompanying
text.
346. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 71 (2005).
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might proceed with a claim. In short, judges are unlikely to want to
address the issue of discrimination against those perceived as
multiracial unless it is clear to them that they have no alternative but
to do so.
In sum, the paucity of claims brought by plaintiffs identified as
multiracial creates a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Plaintiffs’
attorneys are less likely to frame cases in terms of multiracial
discrimination because it makes strategic sense to adhere to an
existing narrative of discrimination based on one of the five wellknown monoracial categories. In the rare instances when plaintiffs
choose to frame their cases by invoking multiracial discrimination,
courts are more inclined to view such cases with skepticism, both
because little precedent has addressed this unfamiliar situation and
because addressing the situation involves complicated analytical work
that the court may be unwilling to perform. Thus, if courts continue
to reframe cases involving multiracial discrimination, the cycle of
erasure will continue to repeat itself. Meanwhile, discrimination
against people perceived as multiracial will remain unaddressed, and
the existence of such discrimination will remain obscured.
3.

Instantiation of racial categories and associated stereotypes
Serious negative consequences flow from continued reliance on
racial categories in antidiscrimination jurisprudence, including harm
to individual narrative integrity and obstacles to raising claims of
multiracial discrimination. But perhaps the most troubling harm is
the impediment to progress toward a more nuanced understanding
of racism and, consequently, of the social construct of race itself.
There is no inherent reason for our racial categories to be the way
they are. Indeed, less than a century ago, our classification of races
348
was quite different.
Consequently, our exclusive reliance on
347. Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that the protected class
under the McDonnell Douglas framework is limited to mixed-race persons “because it
would be impracticable to apply and could be so self limiting that a particular person
is the only identifiable member of the group”).
348. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (2006) (tracing the legal construction of “whiteness” and examining the way
that construction of non-white identities has evolved over the past century).
Of course, it would be disingenuous to deny that the categories of “White” and
“Black” did not exist a hundred years ago; however, López ably demonstrates that the
boundaries of these categories were in fact permeable and that the “intermediate”
racial categories we recognize today bear little resemblance to those of the early
twentieth century. See id. at 27–77.
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arbitrary socially constructed categories in antidiscrimination
jurisprudence calcifies our current understanding of race as well as
the stereotypes that attend each racial category. Karst elaborates that
“the very act of [assigning an identity category in a judicial decision]
serves to intensify categorical meanings—the social truths about what
it means to be black or white[,] . . . etching these group portraits
more deeply in the consciousness of those members of society who
349
learn of the decision.”
Because our antidiscrimination
jurisprudence continually reinforces these categories, they remain
the salient framework for thinking about race, and they prevent more
nuanced understandings. As Ian Haney López explains: “[L]aw
350
constructs race.”
Cognitive psychology research exposes the power of legal regimes
to reinforce existing rigid racial classifications. When people are
exposed to, or “primed” with, a particular categorical framework for
thinking about the world, that framework persists even when the
source of the priming is removed. One precept of modern
psychology is that past experience structures present thinking—in
other words, “people understand the world by relating what they are
currently experiencing to the knowledge that they have previously
351
accumulated.” That knowledge is largely organized into “cognitive
352
structures.”
In interpreting new information, therefore, we are
353
inclined to gravitate toward these existing cognitive structures.
Reliance on the familiar “offers tangible cognitive benefits, such as
rapid inference generation and the efficient deployment of limited
354
processing resources.”
In short, people are much more likely to
remember and process information in terms of preexisting cognitive
355
structures—such as those cognitive structures involving race.
349. Karst, supra note 337, at 282.
350. LÓPEZ, supra note 348, at 7.
351. Constantine Sedikides & John J. Skowronski, The Law of Cognitive Structure
Activation, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 169, 169 (1991).
352. Id.
353. See C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking
Categorically About Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2000) (noting that people
usually “construct and use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the
person perception process”); Sedikides & Skowronski, supra note 351, at 170
(explaining that individuals tend to view things “in terms of one or two cognitive
structures at a time,” even though there may be a “variety of cognitive structures”
through which something could be understood).
354. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 353, at 105.
355. See, e.g., Bower et al., Hierarchical Retrieval Schemes in Recall of Categorized Word
Lists, 8 J. OF VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 323 (1969) (presenting experiments
involving categorized word lists).
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In its reliance on racial categories, antidiscrimination
jurisprudence provides exactly the type of cognitive structure that we
are predisposed to adopt. By couching their analysis in terms of
Hollinger’s ethno-racial pentagon, courts shape and reinforce the
thinking of judges, attorneys, policymakers, scholars, law students,
and other stakeholders who read their opinions. These readers,
in turn, react to the case through subsequent judicial decisions, legal
scholarship, statutory enactments, policies, print and television media
coverage, and blogs. And these sources gradually shape popular
consciousness: “[J]udicial stories are spread among the general
356
population and are absorbed as part of our popular culture.”
By adhering to a particular racial framework, then, courts calcify that
framework in the minds of the readers, who in turn transmit that
framework throughout society.
The reinforcement of a perceptual framework is particularly
troubling with respect to race because the set of categories it imposes
is not neutral in nature. When hazel-eyed people confront a form
that asks them to list their eye color as either brown or green, they
may experience minor annoyance, or may feel that the options they
have are descriptively inaccurate. In the situation of race, however,
this mild irritant is eclipsed by the fact that the existing racial
357
categories, once activated, trigger a host of associated stereotypes.
In many instances, the stereotype is triggered even when only the
358
racial category (rather than the stereotype itself) is primed. Thus,
the negative cognitive associations flow from the use of the category
itself.
Cognitive psychology research has documented the ease with which
racial stereotypes are activated merely by invocation of the racial
category. For example, several studies have demonstrated that police
officers may be more likely to shoot an unarmed Black suspect than

356. Backer, supra note 315, at 614.
357. See, e.g., Lorella Lepore & Rupert Brown, Category and Stereotype Activation:
Is Prejudice Inevitable?, 72 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 275, 283–84 (1997)
(explaining the “inevitability of sterotype activation”); Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra
note 353, at 100 (describing the process through which stereotypes are assimilated by
the mind and then triggered by external stimuli).
358. Lepore & Brown, supra note 357, at 276, 283–84 (noting differences in
stereotype activation between high- and low-prejudice individuals depending on
whether the stereotype or merely the category associated with the stereotype was
primed, but also noting that stereotypic associations resulted for many research
subjects merely as a result of category priming).
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an unarmed White suspect in a computer simulation. Stereotyping,
then, is subconscious and involuntary, and the activation of
stereotypes occurs even among individuals whose beliefs are
360
fundamentally egalitarian.
Consequently, by reinforcing the
existence of a given set of racial categories, courts are also reinforcing
the stereotypes attached to those categories. And the reification of
stereotypes likewise perpetuates the well-documented problem of
361
stereotype threat.
In sum, research indicates that adherence to racial categories in
the antidiscrimination context reifies and entrenches those
categories in our collective social consciousness. Further, this
entrenchment solidifies the stereotypes associated with those
categories. The continued reliance on categories, in short, prevents
social progress away from racism and racial stereotyping. Yet many
scholars have expressed hesitation about dispensing with categories.
In the next Part, I sketch the contours of a functional
antidiscrimination regime that would allow for assertion of noncategorical discrimination without necessarily eliminating categories
altogether.
362

V. “THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER” : RECONCILING
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND MULTIRACIAL IDENTIFICATION
I do not advocate that we remedy the deficiency of racial categories
simply by adding a new category—“multiracial”—thereby converting
the ethno-racial pentagon into a hexagon. A multiracial category
would itself reify prevailing racial classifications by implying that a
multiracial person is the offspring of two members of such “pure”
359. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, INTERPERSONAL REL. & GROUP PROCESSES (2007), available
at http://www.apa.org/journals/releases/psp9261006.pdf (finding that both
community members and police officers had slower response times in deciding how
to react to Black suspects as opposed to White suspects in a shooting simulation);
E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180 (2004), available at http://
www.psychologicalscience.org/pdf/ps/racialbias.pdf (noting that police officers
were able to eliminate their biases only after extensive training).
360. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 353, at 109–13.
361. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual
Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1997) (describing the “stereotype
threat” as “the threat that others’ judgments or [one’s] own actions will negatively
stereotype” an individual).
362. Clara E. Rodriguez et al., Latino Racial Identity: In the Eye of the Beholder?,
2 LATINO STUD. J. 33 (1991) (describing the wide variety of ways in which Latinos
identify themselves and are identified by others).

2010]

JUDICIAL ERASURE OF MIXED-RACE DISCRIMINATION

547

races. And the heterogeneity of those who might be identified as
multiracial itself undermines the utility of such a classification.
Grouping a biracial Black/White individual together with a biracial
Asian/Latina individual impedes recognition of the considerable
differences in the lived experiences of the two individuals.
A multiracial category, then, is not the answer, at least not within the
setting created by the core legal principles that comprise our
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
Some scholars have acquiesced to the inevitability of categories.
Ruth Colker, for instance, argues that “[c]ategorization under the
law . . . is inevitable,” and that “we can be sure that categories will
363
always be the basis of our legal system.”
Martha Minow agrees:
“Cognitively, we need simplifying categories . . . . Ideas that defy neat
categories are difficult to hold on to, even if the idea itself is about
364
the tyranny of categories.”
The solution, these scholars believe,
is to employ better categories: “Recognizing that categories are
indispensable, we should consider how categories can be improved so
365
as not to play a role in the destruction of human identity.” And as a
general matter, scholars writing about race implicitly accept the need
for categories without challenging or discussing that need.
Despite the longstanding reliance on categories within
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, the categorical model need not
and should not remain the paradigm for recognizing racial
discrimination to the exclusion of all other paradigms. Rather, we
should aspire to a more fluid understanding of race, one that
acknowledges animus directed against a person’s perceived race
without an attendant need to define that person’s “objective” racial
identity or to place that person in a category. A jurisprudence
constructed around that understanding would focus entirely on
whether the perception of someone’s race—whatever that perceived
race might be—motivated discriminatory treatment. Analyzing the
relationship between racial perception and discriminatory treatment
could, but would not have to, proceed by reference to defined racial
identity categories.
Existing jurisprudence already indicates that courts are competent
to examine how a person’s race is perceived. In Perkins v. Lake County
363. RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS
AMERICAN LAW xiii (1996).
364. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 64 (1987).
365. COLKER, supra note 363, at xiii.
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366

Department of Utilities, for example, the plaintiff filed a Title VII
claim alleging that he was discriminated against because he was
367
His employer countered that the plaintiff was
American-Indian.
not, in fact, American-Indian and introduced copious evidence
368
attempting to disprove his claim of ancestry.
The court held that
the evidence as to the plaintiff’s ancestry was inconclusive, but that he
could prevail so long as he demonstrated that his employer believed he
was an American-Indian, regardless whether he was “actually” an
369
American-Indian.
The Perkins court’s reliance on the employer’s
perception, rather than an “objective” notion of race, demonstrates
that such an approach could be readily applied to cases involving
multiracial discrimination.
The approach of examining an employer’s perception also
parallels courts’ willingness, in the disability context, to entertain
claims that a plaintiff suffered discrimination because he was
“regarded as” a person with a disability. The Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) defines a person with a “disability” to include
an individual who is “regarded as having” a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
370
371
activities.” In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., for example, the
Supreme Court would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed with his
claim if he had “create[d] a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether [he] is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing
372
his skills.”
In other words, under the ADA, the plaintiff does not
need to show that he was in fact disabled according to the statutory
definition; he only needs to show that other people saw him as being
373
disabled. The fact that courts have found the “regarded as” model
manageable in the disability context indicates that it would be
serviceable in the race discrimination context as well. Indeed,

366. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
367. Id. at 1262.
368. Id. at 1266–69.
369. Id. at 1277–78.
370. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A),(C) (West Supp. 2009).
371. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
372. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
373. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she
has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual
or perceived mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.”).
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it would be ideally suited to race discrimination because the
discriminator’s perspective is central to the act of discrimination.
Given that courts are capable of examining racial perception, it is a
short step to decouple that examination from the notion of
categories. Moreover, the jurisprudence I propose would not jettison
categories altogether.
Rather, my approach would largely
supplement, rather than overhaul, our current antidiscrimination
legal regime.
Nothing in the constitutional and statutory provisions from which
antidiscrimination jurisprudence flows mandates linkage of a
discrimination claim to a category. The Equal Protection Clause
states simply: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
374
laws.” As discussed in Part III, the application of that guarantee to
375
Thus, a
race via a categorical mechanism is a judicial creation.
demonstration that one was denied the equal protection of the laws
does not inherently require a demonstration of membership in, or
discrimination in reference to, a category. If a particular law or
regulation intentionally classifies individuals on the basis of race and
treats some worse than others on that basis, certainly evidence of that
disparate treatment and the underlying discriminatory intent should
provide grounds for a legal remedy. But if that same provision results
in worse treatment for an individual identified as multiracial,
identification with a particular racial category should not be a
prerequisite to recovery. Rather, simply showing that the individual’s
ascribed racial identity—whatever that ascribed identity might be—
was the basis for discrimination should suffice to allow the plaintiff to
recover.
Likewise, Title VII already makes it unlawful for an employer to
“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
376
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
It also
makes it unlawful to “limit, segregate, or classify [any] employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise

374. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
375. See supra notes 174–189 and accompanying text.
376. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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adversely affect his status as an employee” based on his protected
377
status.
Thus, similar to the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on race generally—not necessarily based on
378
membership in a recognized racial category. In practice, of course,
courts examine categories as a means to determine whether a
plaintiff was treated worse than those “outside the protected class” to
379
which the individual belonged. Identification of a protected class,
with members both within and outside that class, serves as a
shorthand for determining whether a plaintiff was treated worse
based on her race. But neither modification of the statute nor a
radical revision of existing jurisprudence is required to contend that
the court need not say what race a mixed-race person is or what race
her comparables are. The plaintiff need only show that the employer
perceived her as racially different and that she was subjected to
discrimination on account of this perceived difference. By adopting
such a regime, courts would place the emphasis on the employer’s
illegitimate use of perceived racial difference as a means for making
employment decisions, rather than on needlessly forcing the plaintiff
to relate her narrative in the context of categories. In some
instances, surely, categories would be invoked; but such invocation
would be a means to show the illegitimate discrimination between
two people based on a perceived racial disparity, not an end in itself.
This approach would circumvent the conundrum foreseen by the
court in Walker, which held that “[m]ultiracial persons may be
considered members of each of the protected groups with which they
380
have any significant identification.”
The Walker court’s solution is
logically questionable, given that an employer may perceive a mixedrace individual quite differently from the way the employer perceives
members of the various categories with which that individual might
be identified. My approach, therefore, shifts the focus to the
employer’s perception rather than creating an artificial affiliation
377. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
378. The EEOC’s Compliance Manual, which abstains from defining race, reflects
this non-categorical approach to racial identification and discrimination. See EEOC
Compliance Manual, supra note 291.
379. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (stating that, in
evaluating whether the petitioner’s professed reason for not hiring the respondent
was merely pretext, one could look at whether White employees engaged in similar
behavior but nevertheless retained employment).
380. Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651, at *1
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994).
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between the individual perceived as multiracial and the categories
with which she has “any significant identification.” Moreover,
the approach I advocate is also appropriately forward-looking.
As discussed previously, the rising rates of interracial marriage are
likely to make the now-idiosyncratic problem Walker presents far
381
more common in just a few decades.
Furthermore, Mitchell illustrates how this approach would reshape
antidiscrimination jurisprudence more indirectly, ultimately making
it more hospitable to claims of multiracial discrimination. In Mitchell,
the court categorized the self-identified Black/White plaintiff as
Black, stating that the plaintiff suffered worse treatment after her
employer noticed that she was visited at the store where she worked
by Black relatives and consequently “discovered . . . that she was
382
black.”
But instead of this category-induced simplification of her
narrative, the court could have said something similar to the
following:
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action
after she was visited at work by Black friends and relatives and that
at one point her employer commented—with a negative
implication—that plaintiff only dated Black men. If established,
these allegations would likely allow plaintiff to succeed on her
claim that she suffered discrimination because of her race.
Plaintiff has testified that her mother is White and that her father is
Black and that many people, at least initially, view her as Latina
and/or White. Consequently, the alleged discrimination may have
occurred because her employer came to view her as Black.
Alternatively, it may have occurred because her employer viewed
her as racially mixed. Regardless, if plaintiff can show that the
adverse employment action was based upon her employer’s
perception of her race, it occurred in violation of Title VII and she
is entitled to compensation.

Although this approach, if applied in Mitchell, would not have
affected the result of the case—i.e., the plaintiff would still have
received court-appointed counsel and would still have been
permitted to proceed to trial—it would have acknowledged the
manner in which the plaintiff presented her claim, and it would have

381. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (compiling statistics on the
increasing rate of interracial marriage).
382. Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
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created precedent upon which future multiracial-identified plaintiffs
383
might more readily identify as multiracial.
In the Title VII context, this reinterpretation of current
jurisprudence could have the effect of creating a question of fact as to
whether two people were racially similarly situated from the
perspective of the employer. But this factual component is entirely
compatible with the current Title VII burden-shifting analysis
established in McDonnell Douglas and refined in Burdine. That analysis
requires the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by showing:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the
position which she held or to which she applied; (3) rejection for the
position despite her qualifications; and (4) selection of an individual
384
outside the protected class to replace the plaintiff.
The burden
then “shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiff’s] rejection’”; if the
defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff’s task is then to create a
factual dispute as to whether the defendant’s proffered reason is
385
pretextual. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing such a genuine
factual question, then the case may proceed to trial.
My proposed modification to the current analysis would simply add
flexibility to the definition of “protected class,” allowing the
protected class to consist of any set of individuals that the employer
disfavored because of their perceived race; any individuals outside of
that set would be outside the protected class. In Moore, for example,
the factfinder would have had to determine whether the selfdescribed dark-skinned African-American plaintiff was perceived by
the employer as racially similarly situated to the lighter-skinned
386
biracial individual who replaced her.
This question may be
difficult; it may involve ambiguous evidence about the employer’s
treatment of the two individuals; and ultimately, it may involve a
common sense judgment. But it is exactly this type of judgment for
which we traditionally rely on juries. Such an approach makes far

383. Such consequences would address concerns relating both to narrative
integrity, discussed in Part IV.B.1, and the inhospitality of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence to claims by people identified as multiracial, discussed in Part IV.B.2.
384. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In Burdine, the Court noted that the
burden of establishing such a prima facie case “is not onerous.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
385. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted).
386. See Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2006 WL 2701058, at *4
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006).
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more sense than the Moore court’s bald assertion that a light-skinned
biracial individual and a dark-skinned African-American individual
are members of the same crude, socially constructed racial category
and that the latter consequently failed to state a prima facie case of
387
discrimination under Title VII.
In advocating for jurisprudential recognition of those who are
discriminated against because they are perceived as multiracial, I wish
to acknowledge three potential critiques of my proposal. First,
I anticipate the objection that my proposal would engender
essentialization by creating a new category of individuals who would
be subjected to a stereotyped mythology of identity. But in the model
I have proposed for the antidiscrimination context, any risk of
essentialism would be substantially mitigated by the focus on outside
perception rather than on inherent identity. The fact that others
identify various individuals as racially mixed does not necessarily
impute any essence to the group itself. Moreover, those identified as
multiracial are resistant to essentialization almost by definition.
The multiracial-identified are a remarkably heterogeneous group,
displaying no consistent physical markers, language, accent,
associations, or behaviors signifying multiraciality. Essentialization is
unlikely simply because little material exists from which one might
construct an essence. Acknowledging discrimination against those
perceived as multiracial is thus unlikely to instantiate the identity of
multiracial people as a group.
Second, I wish to address the critique that acknowledgment of
animus directed at multiracial people would reify the traditional
racial classifications rather than destabilize them. The notion that an
individual is racially mixed implicitly reinforces the notion that pure
races exist: if someone is a racially mixed person, it must be because
he has ancestors of at least two different races, which implies that
different races exist in some form beyond social construction. I take
this concern particularly seriously because one of my goals is to
promote a more nuanced and fluid understanding of race, and if
recognizing multiracial discrimination in fact serves to calcify the
traditional racial categories, then my project is largely self-defeating.
Once again, however, I believe that focusing on the perception of the
discriminator avoids this undesirable result. The fact that a racist
individual discriminates against someone she perceives as racially
387. See id.

554

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:469

mixed does not reinforce the existing racial classification system;
rather, it exposes that classification system as a product of the
discriminator’s own perception. Indeed, by calling attention to the
way that various social cues can arbitrarily cause a discriminator to
perceive someone as racially mixed, the jurisprudential framework I
propose would also force us to recognize the arbitrariness of the
traditional racial categories themselves.
Third, I do not believe that modifying antidiscrimination
jurisprudence to render it more hospitable to individuals perceived
as multiracial would create a logical slippery slope culminating in
recognition of self-proclaimed multiracial people in every legal
context. I recognize the myriad problems involved in the creation of
a multiracial category on the census and other official government
388
forms, which other scholars have discussed in considerable detail.
While I believe that these concerns are significant and that they
deserve serious consideration, I need not address them here because
my project has no automatic implications for other contexts.
The core provisions of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence—the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII—are uniquely focused on the
perception and intent of the person perpetrating the discrimination,
and consequently, the approach I advocate here embraces an “otheridentified” conception of racial identity.
Other contexts—the
diversity and demographic contexts, for example—require a separate
389
debate over what conception of identity to embrace.
I therefore
take no position on the relative advantages and disadvantages of
acknowledging multiracial identity—whether other-ascribed or selfimposed—outside of the provisions I have discussed.
Ultimately, my advocacy of acknowledging animus against those
identified as multiracial reflects my belief that our race
discrimination jurisprudence should focus on racism rather than on
390
the social constructs we call races.
We should aspire to develop a
jurisprudence that does not rely on categories per se, but rather
targets animus directed at an individual due to a particular
perception of his race. I have proposed here the shape that such a
388. See, e.g., THE NEW RACE QUESTION, supra note 6.
389. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
390. Cf. John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty,
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1074 (1997) (“Ironically, while the nation is increasingly
preoccupied with matters and formations of race, there is a general perception that
racism is receding from the national ethos, and this perception only serves to
empower racist forms and expressions.”).
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jurisprudence could take, and I believe that the implementation of
such a jurisprudence is both possible and desirable.
CONCLUSION
Multiracial individuals have long vexed courts and commentators
because they challenge and confound existing racial categories.
Despite the recognition that multiracial individuals have received in
some contexts, the reliance of antidiscrimination jurisprudence on
categories has generally excluded plaintiffs identified as multiracial.
This absence obscures animus directed at multiracial individuals.
Moreover, the dominance of racial categories calcifies existing racial
classifications and the stereotypes associated with them, preventing
society from moving beyond these arbitrary categories.
Courts, therefore, should view the jurisprudential conundrum of
multiracial discrimination as an opportunity.
Acknowledging
multiracial identity and meticulously discussing the discrimination
associated with it provides courts with a context in which to
acknowledge the complexity of lived race. That ongoing project
promises an opportunity to destabilize our preconceptions about race
and the hierarchy that accompanies them.

